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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this doctoral thesis, I explore how vague behavioural or legal standards aﬀect
agents’ decision-making. In particular, I test the extent to which agents engage
in defensive behaviour in the face of vague standards. I measure defensive
behaviour as the extent to which agents make less than eﬃcient decisions for
their principals in order to increase the probability of complying with the vague
standard.
In principal-agent relationships, a principal hires an agent to take a decision
for him. Common examples include the relationship between ﬁrm owner and
manager, between physician and patient and between a lawyer and her client.
Frequently, these relationships are characterized by information asymmetry:
while the principal might have a vague idea of the set of available decisions,
only the agent is aware of the full set of options and can rank them according
to the principal’s expected proﬁt or cost. In reality, even the best decisions can
realize negative outcomes. Due to the information asymmetry, the principal or
a judge cannot easily distinguish a bad outcome that stems from a sub-standard
decision by an unqualiﬁed or even negligent agent and a bad outcome of a
good decision by the agent. Additionally, agents in these relationships often
face dire consequences for sub-standard decision-making. Aside from legal
liability, agents are exposed to the principal’s scrutiny, a loss in reputation
and a reduction in future proﬁts. This constellation of consequences makes
established decisions, conservative decisions or default options attractive to
the agent, since these choices are more likely to be recognized by the principal
(or even by a judge in the course of legal proceedings) as qualiﬁed and non-
negligent. In this situation, defensive or overcompliant behaviour refers to
i
a choice made by the agent in an attempt to meet a behavioural or legal
standard which signals the quality of her decision, and consequently reduces
her probability of being held liable for a bad outcome.
The practical relevance of this dissertation is reﬂected in the eﬀort to re-
structure liability frameworks in various ﬁelds in diﬀerent countries. In the
corporate environment, the Business Judgment Rule1 was promulgated to en-
able managers to take innovative decisions without being exposed to a risk of
liability. In the health sector, multiple countries have altered liability schemes
or introduced state-run no-fault compensation schemes. By reducing the li-
ability pressure and the exposure to vague standards, policy makers seek to
encourage the application of novel treatment methods or medication and fa-
cilitate socially beneﬁcial deviations from defaults.
This dissertation contributes to two main areas of research: On the one
hand, I address the problem of moral hazard for decision-making in principal-
agent relationships (e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1983; Harris and Raviv, 1979;
Mirrlees, 1976; Shavell, 1997). My speciﬁc contribution is that I draw attention
to the problem of defensive behavior, as opposed to self-interested behavior in
general. On the other hand all three chapters of this dissertation relate to
the ﬁeld of law and economics, speciﬁcally to the discussion of optimal legal
incentives and standards (e.g. Shavell, 1980; Landes and Posner, 1981; Kahan,
1989; Kaplow, 1992) and the eﬀect of legal indeterminacy (e.g. Craswell and
Calfee, 1986; Lang, 2014). Here my contribution consists of providing empirical
arguments to a predominantly theoretical discussion.
In Chapter 2, I examine defensive behaviour in the absence of potential
monetary liability. I use a laboratory experiment to compare a scenario in
which agents have no reason at all to make a defensive decision for their prin-
cipal to a scenario where the agent may have a non-monetary reason to make
a defensive action. I do this in order to establish whether a vague standard
of judgement by a principal can, by itself, induce an agent to deviate from
the optimal choice. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I test in a laboratory ex-
periment whether increasing the variability of a legal standard increases or
reduces socially desirable behaviour. The predictions in both cases are based
1 The Business Judgment Rule is legal principle derived from Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania
R. Co. (61 F. Supp. 905 (D.C. Pa. 1945)) that grants immunity from liability towards the
cooperation for directors, managers, and further agents of a corporation. Immunity was
granted as long as agents could prove that they only took decisions within their authority
and according to the principle of Good Faith (Arsht, 1979).
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on the model of Craswell and Calfee (1986), which is expanded in Chapter 3
to incorporate risk preferences and reference-dependent preferences, and social
preferences in Chapter 4.
Chapter 2 was written in cooperation with Prof. Dr. Oliver Kirchkamp2.
My contribution to this project was the following: idea – major, literature
review – major, experimental design and data collection – major, data analysis
– minor. Chapter 3 is a joint work with Dr. Sven Hoeppner3, my contribution
here was the following: idea – major, literature review – moderate, theoretical
model – minor, experimental design and data collection – major, data analysis
– moderate. The last chapter is solely mine. The following is a brief summary
of Chapters 2 through 4:
Pride and Malpractice
In Chapter 2, we study the impact of defensive decision-making in principal-
agent relationships. In particular, we investigate whether defensive decision-
making persists as a signalling mechanism, even in the absence of monetary
liability, under anonymity and in a setting without repeated interactions. In a
scenario in which agents do not have any ﬁnancial incentive to make defensive
choices, the only reason to do so is to signal their eﬀort and intention towards
the principal.
The research is motivated by the results from public health research that
show that defensive medicine persists in jurisdictions in which physicians face
a relatively low risk of liability (Steurer, Held, Schmidt, Gigerenzer, Tag, and
Bachmann, 2009) and even in countries that previously implemented so-called
quasi no-fault compensation schemes (Cunningham and Dovey, 2006). Chap-
ter 2 also relates to the economics literature that discuss preferences for social
approval (e.g. Akerlof, 1980; Holländer, 1990; Lindbeck, 1997), in principal-
agent relationships with moral hazard (Casadesus-Masanell, 2004) and in lab-
oratory experiments (e.g. Rege and Telle, 2004).
In the laboratory experiment we provide a setting in which each participant
has the possibility to earn a hypothetical qualiﬁcation through his work in a
real eﬀort task. In the next step, a qualiﬁed participant (agent) can then choose
between two lotteries for another participant (principal). Depending on which
2 Professor for Empirical and Experimental Economics at University of Jena
3 Ghent University
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lottery the agent chooses, the earned qualiﬁcation will either be signalled to the
principal, or not. We compare this to the results from a similar task in which
the agent’s qualiﬁcation is always signalled to the principal, irrespective of the
the chosen lottery. The experiment allows to us to determine whether and by
how much an agent is willing to reduce his principal’s expected proﬁt to signal
his earned qualiﬁcation and to avoid being mistaken for an unqualiﬁed agent.
Subsequently, we inquire whether this willingness is aﬀected by measures of
social preferences.
Our results suggest that some agents are willing to reduce the expected
proﬁt of their principals, irrespective of whether qualiﬁcation is signalled se-
lectively. While we ﬁnd that the proportion of defensive choices is actually
slightly smaller when qualiﬁcation is signalled selectively, the magnitude of de-
fensive behavior is larger. We do not ﬁnd this to be associated with measured
social preferences. A positive result is the fact that investment in qualiﬁcation
is slightly higher when signals are sent selectively. With the minimal scenario,
we try to establish a lower benchmark for the willingness to reduce a principal’s
expected proﬁt in order to transfer information about acquired qualiﬁcation
and the quality of an activity choice. But as the manipulation is rather weak,
we only capture a very weak eﬀect.
To Comply or Not to Comply: The Eﬀect of Changes in
Standard Variability on Eﬀorts to Comply
In Chapter 3, we investigate the eﬀect of legal standard vagueness on eﬀorts
to comply with the legal standard. In the ﬁeld of law and economics, our
research contributes to the literature by oﬀering an empirical argument to
a conﬂict between legal scholars and economists on the eﬀects of legal uncer-
tainty on rule-subjected individuals: On the one hand, legal scholars claim that
diﬃcult-to-predict legal consequences are costly, as they crowd-out socially
beneﬁcial activities (Trubek, 1972; Weber, 1978) and advocate the reduction
of legal uncertainty (see e.g. D’Amato, 1983; Popelier, 2000; Maxeiner, 2006,
2007; Raitio, 2008; Smits, 2012). This argument is opposed by research from
economic theory which ﬁnds that increasing legal uncertainty can encourage
socially beneﬁcial behaviour, such as the reduction of ineﬃcient overcompliance
(Craswell and Calfee, 1986). This also leads to diﬀerent policy recommenda-
tions from both sides: while economists stress the importance of optimal rule
design, legal scholars lobby for the reduction of legal uncertainty at all costs.
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We base our hypotheses on Craswell and Calfee (1986)’s model that anal-
yses a person’s activity choice under a vague legal standard, where own proﬁt
and the magnitude of a possible liability payment increase in the activity level.
The vague standard is drawn from a known, normal probability distribution.
Diﬀerent degrees of legal standard vagueness are modelled as changes in the
dispersion of the probability distribution. As a result of the original model,
the authors predict overcompliance at small degrees of legal vagueness and un-
dercompliance at large degrees of standard vagueness. The resulting U-shaped
relationship has the feature that at some vague standard, further increases
in standard vagueness might actually reduce ineﬃcient overcompliance. The
model also oﬀers the intriguing possibility of a second best solution to legal cer-
tainty: At least theoretically there exists a level of standard vagueness at which
behaviour is eﬃcient. We update the model’s assumptions about a person’s
risk and reference dependent preferences and test the resulting predictions in
a controlled laboratory experiment.
Our main results support the standard economic model of Craswell and
Calfee (1986): on average we ﬁnd overcompliance at suﬃciently low levels of
standard vagueness. This changes beyond a tipping point, any further increases
of standard vagueness now reduce the level of overcompliance and eventually
induce undercompliance. Moreover, we ﬁnd two unexpected results that are
of interest to the lawmaker. First, the proportion of compliant choices grad-
ually reduces with increasing standard vagueness, while the share of socially
desirable (as opposed to socially undesirable) choices sharply drops—with so-
cially undesirable choices far outweighing socially desirable ones, as soon as
standard vagueness exceeds the quasi-certain level. Secondly, we ﬁnd that be-
haviour becomes more erratic as standards grow exceedingly vague. This loss
of the law’s coordination function represents a further cost of legal standard
vagueness which is not commonly discussed in the literature.
Better Safe than Sorry: Can Social Preferences Mitigate
Defensive Behaviour under Vague Standards?
In Chapter 4, I expand the theoretical model and the experimental set-up from
Chapter 3, to allow for the presence of social preferences. I thereby test the
robustness of ??hapter 3’s results and take a closer look at the speciﬁc eﬀect
of legal standard vagueness in situations with close social proximity between a
tortfeasor and an injured party, such as principal-agent relationships. The aim
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is to determine whether pro-social preferences actually mitigate the occurrence
of defensive behaviour.
I generate a set of behavioral predictions based on the inclusion of either
inequity aversion, preferences for social eﬃciency or maximin preferences and
proceed to test these in the laboratory. While the payoﬀ structure for the de-
cision maker remains the same as in the earlier experiment, the chosen activity
level now generates a real negative externality for another participant, which
in turn determines the magnitude of a liability payment. All participants make
choices for various levels of standard vagueness, with and without an aﬀected
second participant.
As a ﬁrst result, I replicate the presence of overcompliance, but without the
characteristic U-shaped relationship between precaution and the level of stan-
dard vagueness in the baseline group. Instead I ﬁnd that defensive behavior
increases with standard vagueness. The collected data therefore casts doubt
on the theoretical predictions of Calfee and Craswell (1986) as well as on the
experimental results from Chapter 3. Furthermore, I do not ﬁnd an eﬀect of
the introduction of a second participant whose proﬁt is aﬀected by the level
of precaution of the decision maker in the treatment group. I ﬁnd defensive
behaviour of the same degree in both groups, which increases with standard
vagueness, but that pro-social preferences somewhat mitigate defensive behav-
ior. Yet, the data show that internalized pro-social preferences explain decision
making only at low levels of standard vagueness and loose their importance
when standards become suﬃciently vague. As in Chapter 3, I also ﬁnd that
behaviour becomes increasingly erratic as standard vagueness increases.
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Zusammenfassung und Einleitung:
Defensives Verhalten in
Prinzipal-Agenten-Beziehungen
1.1 Allgemeine Einleitung auf Deutsch
In der vorliegenden Dissertation beschäftige ich mich mit dem Entscheidungsver-
halten von Agenten, wenn Rechts- oder Verhaltensstandards nur vage deﬁniert
sind. Vor allem interessiert mich hier das Auftreten von defensivem Verhalten,
der Bereitschaft des Agenten, suboptimale Entscheidungen für seinen Prinzi-
pal zu treﬀen, wenn diese Entscheidungen die Wahrscheinlichkeit erhöhen, den
vagen Rechts- oder Verhaltensstandard zu erfüllen.
In der Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie beauftragt ein Prinzipal einen Agenten
damit, eine Entscheidung für ihn zu treﬀen. Charakteristisch für diese Beziehung
ist der Wissensvorsprung des Agenten vor dem Prinzipal: Obwohl der Prinzi-
pal eine entfernte Vorstellung von den möglichen Entscheidungsalternativen
hat, kennt nur der Agent die Gesamtheit der Optionen und ihren ﬁnanziellen
Konsequenzen für den Prinzipal. Nur der Agent ist in der Lage, die optimale
Option zu identiﬁzieren und auszuwählen. Als Beispiele werden häuﬁg die
Beziehung zwischen dem Firmeninhaber und der Unternehmensleitung, zwis-
chen dem Arzt und seinem Patienten oder zwischen dem Anwalt und seinem
Klienten benannt.
Man die möglichen Entscheidungsoptionen mit Lotterielosen mit verschiede-
nen Erfolgschancen vergleichen. Auch eine optimale Option kann für den
Prinzipal ein positives oder ein negatives Resultat realisieren; allerdings ist
das Ergebnis häuﬁger positiv als bei suboptimalen Optionen. Auf Grund der
vorhandenen Informationsasymmetrie ist es schwierig, für den Prinzipal oder
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für einen Richter zu entscheiden, ob ein negatives Resultat die Folge einer sub-
optimalen Entscheidung eines unqualiﬁzierten oder gar varlässigen Agenten
war oder einfach das negative Resultat einer optimalen Entscheidung.
Hinzu kommt, dass Agenten in den beschriebenen Beziehungen oft mit
unangenehmen Konsequenzen rechnen müssen, wenn man ihnen suboptimale,
unqualiﬁzierte oder fahrlässige Entscheidungen nachweisen kann. Neben geset-
zlicher Haftung sind Agenten dem Misstrauen und Ärger des Prinzipals aus-
gesetzt und fürchten den Verlust ihrer Reputation und zukünftiger Aufträge.
Diese Konstellation von Umständen macht etablierte und konservative Op-
tionen attraktiver für den Agenten. Da diese Entscheidungsoptionen einen
höheren Bekanntheitsgrad haben, ist es wahrscheinlicher, dass der Prinzipal
(oder der Richter, wenn es zum Rechtsstreit kommen sollte) diese Optionen
als qualiﬁziert und nicht fahrlässig erkennt. Defensives Verhalten entsteht hier
also, weil der Agent dringend den Rechts- oder Verhaltensstandard erfüllen will
und darum die Signalwirkung einer Entscheidungsoption über die Erfolgsquote
und die Eﬀektivität stellt.
Die praktische Relevanz dieser Dissertation spiegelt sich in der weltweiten
Restrukturierung der Haftbarkeit in verschiedenen Bereichen wider. Im ge-
schäftlichen Bereich wurde defensivem Handeln mit der Business Judgment
Rule ("Regel für unternehmerische Entscheidungen")4 vorgebeugt. Dem Un-
ternehmensleiter wird hinsichtlich der zu treﬀenden unternehmerischen Entschei-
dungen ein gewisser Spielraum eingeräumt, persönliche Haftbarkeit wird aus-
geschlossen so lange der Unternehmensleiter belegen kann, dass er alle Entschei-
dungen mit Sorgfalt getroﬀen hat. Im Gesundheitswesen haben einige Län-
der einen ähnlichen Weg eingeschlagen, indem sie die Haftung für Mediziner
eingeschränkt haben oder gänzlich durch staatliche Versicherungen ersetzt
haben. Die Verringerung des Drucks durch Haftbarkeit und der Umgang mit
vagen Rechtsstandards soll die Anwendung von innovativen Behandlungsmeth-
oden oder Medikamenten fördern und die Abweichung von etablierten Metho-
den vereinfachen.
Der Beitrag dieser Dissertation verteilt sich auf zwei Hauptbereiche: Auf
der einen Seite beschäftige ich mich mit dem Problem von Moral Hazard
("moralischer Versuchung") für Entscheidungen in Prinzipal-Agenten- Beziehun-
gen (z.B. Grossman und Hart, 1983; Harris und Raviv, 1979; Mirrlees, 1976;
Shavell, 1997). Statt auf eigennützigem Verhalten im Allgemeinen, liegt mein
4 Die Business Judgment Rule wird hergeleitet von Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co.
(61 F. Supp. 905 (D.C. Pa. 1945)).
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Fokus auf dem Auftreten von defensivem Verhalten in Folge von Moral Haz-
ard. Auf der anderen Seute befassen sich alle drei Aufsätze mit Themen aus
der Rechtsökonomik, der Diskussion zu optimalen Anreizen und Rechtsstan-
dards (z.B. Shavell, 1980; Landes und Posner, 1981; Kahan, 1989; Kaplow,
1992) und dem Eﬀekt von Rechtsunsicherheit (z.B. Craswell und Calfee, 1986;
Lang, 2014). Ich trage hier empirische Argumente zu einer weitgehend theo-
riebasierten Diskussion bei.
In Kapitel 2 widme ich mich defensivem Verhalten in einem System ohne
ﬁnanzielle Haftung. Mit Hilfe eines Experiments vergleiche ich eine Situation
in der Agenten keinen Grund haben, defensive Entscheidungen zu treﬀen, mit
einer Situation, in der sie defensive Entscheidungen treﬀen können, um ihre
Qualiﬁkation zu signalisieren. Das Ziel ist herauszuﬁnden, ob ein vager Ver-
haltensstandard einen Agenten dazu bringen kann, von der optional Entschei-
dungsoption abzuweichen.
In Kapitel 3 und Kapitel 4 teste ich mit Hilfe eines Experiments, ob die
zunehmende Variabilität eines Rechtsstandards aus gesellschaftlicher Sicht zu
mehr oder weniger eﬃzienten Entscheidungen führt. In beiden Fällen basieren
die Vorhersagen auf einem Modell von Craswell und Calfee (1986). Das Modell
wird in Kapitel 3 um Risikopräferenzen und Präferenzen aus der Erwartungs-
theorie erweitert. In Kapitel 4 wird das Modell um verschiedenene Sozial-
präferenzen ergänzt.
Kapitel 2 ist in Zusammenarbeit mit Prof. Dr. Oliver Kirchkamp5 ent-
standen und Kapitel 3 ist ein Gemeinschaftsprojekt mit Dr. Sven Hoeppner6.
Das letzte Kapitel wurde von mir alleine verfasst.
Defensives Verhalten in Abwesenheit von ﬁnanzieller Haf-
tung (Pride and Malpractice)
In Kapitel 2 befassen wir uns mit defensiven Entscheidungen in Prinzipal-
Agenten-Beziehungen, wir betrachten Szenarien ohne ﬁnanzielle Haftung, unter
Anonymität von Prinzipal und Agent, die auch nur einmalig miteinander in-
teragieren. Wenn ﬁnanzielle Haftung ausgeschlossen ist, besteht der einzige
Grund für defensives Verhalten darin, dem Prinzipal die eigene Qualiﬁkation
signalisieren zu wollen.
5 Professor for Empirical and Experimental Economics at University of Jena
6 Ghent University
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Das Projekt wird durch Forschungsergebnisse aus dem Bereich der Gesund-
heitswissenschaften motiviert, welche zeigen, dass defensive Medizin auch in
Rechtssystemen besteht, in welchen das Haftungsrisiko für Mediziner relativ
gering ist (Steurer, Held, Schmidt, Gigerenzer, Tag, und Bachmann, 2009),
oder wo die Haftung ganz ausgeschlossen ist (Cunningham und Dovey, 2006).
Kapitel 2 steht auch im Bezug zur verhaltensökonomischen Literatur, die sich
mit der Vorliebe für gesellschaftliche Anerkennung befasst (e.g. Akerlof, 1980;
Holländer, 1990; Lindbeck, 1997).
Zu Beginn des Experiments hat jeder Teilnehmer die Möglichkeit, sich
durch Leistung in einer Aufgabe eine ﬁktive Qualiﬁkation zu erarbeiten. Im
nächsten Schritt kann ein qualiﬁzierter Teilnehmer (Agent) zwischen verschiede-
nen Lotterielosen für einen anderen Teilnehmer (Prinzipal) auswählen. Je
nachdem welches Los der Agent auswählt, wird die erarbeitete Qualiﬁkation
dem Prinzipal signalisiert, oder eben nicht. Wir vergleichen die getroﬀenen
Entscheidungen mit den Ergebnissen aus einer ähnlichen Aufgabe, bei der
die erarbeitete Qualiﬁkation dem Prinzipal allerdings in jedem Fall mitgeteilt
wird. Der Unterschied zwischen den Aufgaben soll zeigen, ob die Teilnehmer
wissentlich suboptimale Entscheidungen für ihren jeweiligen Prinzipal treﬀen,
um dem Prinzipal ihre ﬁktive Qualiﬁkation zu signalisieren. Anschließend
prüfen wir, ob der Grad der Abweichung von der optimalen Entscheidung mit
den von uns gemessenen Sozialpräferenzen zusammenhängt.
Wir beobachten, dass ein Teil der Agenten immer suboptimale Entschei-
dungen triﬀt, unabhängig davon, ob ihre Qualiﬁkation dem Prinzipal signal-
isiert wird. Unsere Daten zeigen, dass der Anteil der defensiven Entscheidun-
gen geringer ist, wenn man die Qualiﬁkation gezielt durch defensives Verhalten
signalisieren kann. Allerdings ist in diesem Fall die durchschnittliche Abwe-
ichung von der optimalen Entscheidung höher in diesem Fall. Durch die Abbil-
dung eines minimalen Szenarios wollen wir eine Untergrenze für das Auftreten
von defensivem Verhalten erstellen. "Wie viel defensives Verhalten kann man
in der Abwesenheit von ﬁnanzieller Haftung, unter Anonymität und bei ein-
maliger Interaktion erwarten?" Da die resultierende Manipulation nicht sehr
stark ist, können wir nur einen schwachen Eﬀekt erfassen.
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Verhalten unter vagen Rechtsstandards: Der Eﬀekt von
Veränderungen der Variabilität auf das Bemühen den Stan-
dard zu erfüllen
In Kapitel 3 befassen wir uns mit dem Einﬂuss von Rechtsunsicherheit auf
das Bestreben einen solchen, vagen Rechtsstandard zu erfüllen. Im Bereich
der Rechtsökonomik trägt unsere Forschung empirische Argumente zu dem
Konﬂikt über den Eﬀekt von unsicheren Rechtsstandards, zwischen Rechtswis-
senschaftlern und Ökonomen bei: Auf der einen Seite behaupten Rechtswis-
senschaftler, dass enorme Kosten mit der fehlenden Vorhersehbarkeit von recht-
lichen Konsequenzen verbunden sind, da diese diverse Aktivitäten mit sozialem
Nutzen verdrängen würde (Trubek, 1972; Weber, 1978). Daher bewirbt diese
Gruppe die konsequente Reduktion von Rechtsunsicherheit (see e.g. D’Amato,
1983; Popelier, 2000; Maxeiner, 2006, 2007; Raitio, 2008; Smits, 2012). Auf
der anderen Seite argumentieren die Ökonomen, dass Rechtsunsicherheit auch
den sozialen Nutzen erhöhen kann, zum Beispiel durch die Reduktion von de-
fensivem Verhalten (Craswell und Calfee, 1986).
Die Hypothesen in Kapitel 3 basieren auf dem Modell von Calfee und
Craswell (1986). Im Modell wählt eine Person ein Aktivitätslevel. Mit dem Ak-
tivitätslevel steigen gleichzeitig der eigene Gewinn und die Höhe einer möglichen
Haftung. Der vage Rechtsstandard wird aus einer bekannten Normalverteilung
gezogen. Unterschiedliche Grade an Rechtsunsicherheit werden durch ver-
schiedene Werte in der Varianz der Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung modelliert.
Das Orginalmodell sagt defensives Verhalten bei geringer Rechtsunsicherheit
und fahrlässiges Verhalten bei großer Unsicherheit voraus. Die resultierende U-
förmige Beziehung birgt eine Besonderheit, nämlich die Möglichkeit ab einem
gewissen Grad an Rechtsunsicherheit durch eine weitere Erhöhung der Un-
sicherheit, ineﬃzientes und defensives Verhalten reduzieren zu können. Theo-
retisch könnte man so auch eﬃzientes Verhalten herbeiführen.
Wir aktualisieren das Modell, indem wir es um Erkenntnisse aus der Ver-
haltensökonomie erweitern. Die erneuerten Vorhersagen testen wir in einem
Experiment.
Unsere wichtigsten Ergebnisse unterstützen das Modell von Calfee und
Craswell (1986): im Durchschnitt ﬁnden wir defensives Verhalten bei relativ
geringer Rechtsunsicherheit. Nach einem Wendepunkt reduzieren weitere Zu-
nahmen an Unsicherheit das defensive Verhalten. Wir ﬁnden zwei unerwartete
Ergebnisse. Zum einen nimmt der Anteil der rechtskonformen Entscheidungen
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allmählich mit zunehmender Unsicherheit ab, während der Anteil der eﬃzien-
ten Entscheidungen rapide abfällt. Zum anderen dokumentieren wir, dass das
Entscheidungsverhalten mit zunehmender Rechtsunsicherheit erratisch wird.
Hier verliert der Rechtsstandard sein Koordinationspotential, was einen weit-
eren Kostenpunkt der Rechtsunsicherheit verdeutlicht.
Vorsicht ist besser als Nachsicht: Können Sozialpräferen-
zen defensives Verhalten unter vagen Rechtsstandards ab-
mildern?
In Kapitel 4 erweitere ich das theoretische Modell und das Experimentde-
sign aus Kapitel 3 um den Einﬂuss von Sozialpräferenzen. Ich teste damit
die Ergebnisse aus Kapitel 3 und fokussiere auf den Eﬀekt von Rechtsun-
sicherheit in Situationen mit einer gewissen Nähe zwischen einem möglichen
Schädiger und einem Geschädigten (wie es der Fall ist, bei Prinzipal-Agenten-
Beziehungen). Mein Ziel ist es zu erfahren, ob Sozialpräferenzen das Auftreten
von defensivem Verhalten eindämmen können.
Ich generiere meine Vorhersagen unter Einbeziehung von Ungleichheitsaver-
sion, Präferenzen für soziale Eﬃzienz und Maximin-Präferenzen, anschließend
teste ich die Vorhersagen mit einem Experiment. Die Struktur des Experiments
bleibt im Vergleich zum vergangenen Kapitel weitgehend unverändert, mit dem
Unterschied, dass das gewählte Aktivitätslevel nun eine negative Auswirkung
auf den Verdienst eines Mitspielers hat. Die Höhe der negativen Auswirkung
bestimmt die Höhe der möglichen Haftung.
Das erste Ergebnis ist, dass ich das Auftreten von defensivem Verhal-
ten replizieren kann, allerdings ﬁnde ich nicht die charakteristische U-förmige
Beziehung zwischen dem Aktivitätslevel und dem Grad an Rechtsunsicherheit.
Statt dessen verstärkt zunehmende Rechtsunsicherheit das defensive Verhal-
ten. Die Daten suggerieren, dass es keinen Zusammenhang zwischen der Ein-
führung eines "Geschädigten" und dem gewählten Aktivitätslevel gibt. Die
gemessenen Sozialpräferenzen mildern defensives Verhalten zwar ab, erklären
Verhaltensunterschiede lediglich für ge- ringe Grade an Unsicherheit. Wie auch
in Kapitel 3 ﬁnde ich zunehmend erratisches Entscheidungsverhalten, je größer
die Unsicherheit ist.
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Chapter 2
Pride and Malpractice
Abstract: We present the results of an experiment to study the impact of
defensive decision making in principal-agent relationships. We compared sce-
narios in which agents have or have no reason to make a defensive decision for
their principal. We investigate whether agents are willing to reduce a prin-
cipal’s expected payoﬀ in order to transfer information about themselves and
the quality of the choice they made for the principal. Accordingly, the manip-
ulation is very weak and we ﬁnd only a very small eﬀect. Still, we establish
that defensive behaviour can occur in the absence of ﬁnancial liability and that
there are other causes which should be considered.
Keywords: signalling; principal-agent; defensive behaviour; no-fault compen-
sation; medical malpractice
2.1 Introduction
Several economic interactions in which two parties cooperate under informa-
tion asymmetry and who are forced to share risks can be described in terms of
principal- agent relationships. The literature is rich in the description of exam-
ples of such relationships, such as between employer and employee, professional
and client, insurer and insured and between shareholder and management, and
in devising strategies to solve the emerging problems (e.g. Grossman and Hart,
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1983; Harris and Raviv, 1979; Mirrlees, 1976; Shavell, 1997). All these exam-
ples have in common that the principal depends on the outcome of an activity
choice which was made by the agent. Slightly diﬀerent is the model used by
Shavell (1979) which assumes that the agent’s selected activity doesn’t deter-
mine the principal’s proﬁt alone, but rather does so in combination with a
random element.1
Since agent and principal often do not derive proﬁts from the possible ac-
tivity choices in the same way, the agent has an incentive to deviate from the
principal’s preferred choice to increase his own proﬁt. Such a possibility ex-
ists when the principal cannot perfectly observe the agent or has incomplete
information about the choice set. This is a common situation, as many agents
are hired as expert decision makers by a less informed principal. Incentive
schemes, contracts and the possibility to demand restitution in court are con-
sidered functional means to discipline selﬁsh agents. However, these measures
also produce an unintended consequence: agents might also deviate from the
principal’s proﬁt-maximizing activity choice, by taking costly actions to signal
the quality of their decisions and intentions in order to avoid allegations of
being selﬁsh and forgoe potential lititgation.
The potential costs of such ’defensive decisions’ in the corporate environ-
ment have played a determining role in issuing the Business Judgment Rule2
and have induced a reconsideration or even replacement of medical malprac-
tice liability frameworks with no-fault schemes in various countries, includ-
ing New Zealand (1974), Sweden (1975) and Finland (1987).3. While a rich
body of research in countries with high liability pressure documents that dif-
ferent types of medical treatment are adjusted in response to liability pres-
1 The model of Shavell (1979) assumes that an agent can select a costly eﬀort level in his
work for the principal. The principal’s derives utility from wealth, which is a function of
the agent’s eﬀort and a random factor, the "state of nature". Furthermore, the principal’s
ability to observe the agent’s eﬀort is also contingent on the eﬀort level and the state of
nature.
2 The Business Judgement Rule is legal principle derived from Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania
R. Co. (61 F. Supp. 905 (D.C. Pa. 1945)) that introduces immunity from liability towards
the cooperation for directors, managers, and other agents of a corporation, as long as they
could prove that all conducted transaction were within their authority and that the decisions
were taken according to the principle of Good Faith (Arsht, 1979).
3 Aside from good medical practise, no-fault compensation schemes are preferred for lower
costs as compared to the cost of medical malpractice insurance premiums, lower administra-
tive costs (Danzon, 1994), better and faster compensation for harmed individuals (Brahams,
1988) and better opportunities for error management (Studdert and Brennan, 2001).
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sure4 a questionnaire study on practicioners in Switzerland, where law suits
agains physicians are considerably less frequent, by (Steurer, Held, Schmidt,
Gigerenzer, Tag, and Bachmann, 2009) shows that even in jurisdictions with
relatively low risk of medical liability, physicians order additional screening
measures5 to defend themselves against lawsuits. A study by (Cunningham
and Dovey, 2006) revealed that even in countries that adopted quasi no-fault
compensation schemes physicians react to oﬃcial complaints with defensive
practices6. It can be concluded that the magnitude of defensive behavior is
aﬀected by the liklihood and cost of law suits, but that defensive behavior can
also emerge when liability pressure is low or even absent. Questionnaire stud-
ies with physicians who recently recived a complaint, by Cunningham (2004)
attribute this ﬁnding to experienced feelings of reduced conﬁdence, anger, guilt
and shame associated with a patient’s complain. Defensive decision-making,
motivated through a preference for social approval and a fear of disapproval is
also described in the economic literature. The importance of social approval
in motivating economic agents was ﬁrst mentioned by (Smith, 1759)7 and can
be found in various economic models: e.g as the reason for setting fair, rather
than market-clearing wages (Akerlof, 1980) or to explain voluntary cooperative
behavior for a pure collective good (Holländer, 1990). The importance of social
approval has been related to the principal-agent problem with moral hazard by
Casadesus-Masanell (2004) who assumes that agents suﬀer a disutility, caused
by shame or distress if their actions diverge from a given social standard, and
adapt their behaviour. Economic experiments have conﬁrmed the motivation
4 e.g. (Localio, 1993) found that compared to low premium areas, cesarians were three
times as common in high premium regions, a later study by (Yang, Mello, Subramanian,
and Studdert, 2009) over the period from 1991 to 2003 found a positive relationship between
malpractice premiums and primary cesarian sections and a negative relationship between
premiums and rates of vaginal birth after cesarean sections. Both studies conclude that the
liability environment aﬀects pracitces in obstetrics.]
5 The study found that 41% of general practitioners and 43% of internists in Switzerland
sometimes or often recommended prostate-speciﬁc antigen (PSA) screening merely for legal
reasons.
6 A survey and interview study on physicians in New Zealand who recently received a
patient complaint by physicians adjusted their behavior subsequently in terms of positive
and negative defensive practices. Changes included increased referral rates, documentation
and consenting, screening for problem patients and withdrawal from the doctor-patient
relationship and speciﬁc practice areas.
7 "We are pleased, not only with praise, but with having done what is praise-worthy.
We are pleased to think that we have rendered ourselves the natural object of approbation,
(. . . ): and we are mortiﬁed to reﬂect that we justly merited the blame of those we live with
(. . . )." (Smith, 1759)[p.115, 116]
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for social approval in the laboratory in a variety of settings. As one example,
Rege and Telle (2004) ﬁnd that contributions to a public good double when
other participants can observe contributions, as compared to the anonymous
setting.
The ﬁnding that defensive behaviour cannot easily be eroded by the ad-
justment of ﬁnancial liability motivates our research. We try to establish a
lower benchmark for the willingness to reduce a principal’s expected proﬁt in
order to transfer information about acquired qualiﬁcation and the quality of
an activity choice. In a laboratory experiment, agents can choose between
two diﬀerent lotteries, a default lottery and an alternative lottery. The two
lotteries diﬀer in their respective probabilities for a good and a bad outcome
for a principal. In the case of the physician, the two lotteries resemble two
types of medical treatment. Furthermore, the choice of the lottery also deter-
mines how the information about the quality of the agent’s choice is signalled
to the principal. With the default lottery the quality is signalled to the prin-
cipal with certainty. The default lottery can be thought of as a frequently
used medication or an additional screening measure in the medical context.
The alternative lottery only signals quality some of the time, namely when the
outcome for the principal is good. When the outcome is bad, the principal
cannot distinguish between the ’unfortunate’ outcome of a qualiﬁed choice, or
the typically bad outcome produced by an unqualiﬁed choice. All other things
equal, agents prefer to choose the lottery which always signals the quality of
the choice. This is certainly the case when signalling choice quality can prevent
ﬁnancial liability in case of a bad outcome for the principal, but should also
hold in the minimal scenario to prevent the previously mentioned emotional
consequences.
Therefore the agent’s choice is driven by a trade-oﬀ between maximizing
the principal’s expected proﬁt on the one hand and by a desire to make a
choice which signals quality. As s consequence of this dilemma, we expect that
agents are willing to choose a default option for their principal, even when the
expected payoﬀ is signiﬁcantly lower than that of the non-standard alternative.
This behaviour is congruent with the deﬁnition of moral hazard.
In this following Section 2.2 we will give a detailed description of the de-
picted situation, the experimental set-up, the relevant hypotheses and the
conduction of the experiment. The hypotheses will be tested in Section 4.4.
We will then evaluate the results and their implications in Section 2.4 and
ﬁnally present our concluding remarks in Section 2.5.
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2.2 The Experiment
2.2.1 The Situation: Signalling in Principal-Agent Rela-
tionships
In this study we investigate whether an agent is willing to reduce her principal’s
expected proﬁt in order to to signal the quality of her choice for the principal, to
her principal. We want to determine whether defensive behaviour can prevail
in the absence of legal liability or monetary compensation, simply because of a
desire by agents to signal their ability and intention to make qualiﬁed choices,
in order to gain social approval and avoid disapproval.
We depict a principal-agent relationship, such as can be found between a
ﬁrm owner and ﬁrm manager or between a physician and her patient. In this
relationship, the principal needs to choose one option among multiple possi-
bilities. As the principal lacks information, he can neither see the full range of
choices nor determine the possible outcomes of each choice. Accordingly, the
principal delegates the choice to an agent whose task it is to make the best
possible choice for her principal. In the business context, such choices concern
the adoption of a speciﬁc business strategy or selecting an investment opportu-
nity among several possibilities. In the physician-patient context, physicians
choose for their patients among a variety of diagnostic tools and treatment
possibilities and between various types of medications.
In both real world scenarios, the agent’s choice options can be described
as lotteries. Each choice option can have more than one outcome and each
outcome is realized with a speciﬁc probability. If we simplify the space of
possible outcomes, we can say that each choice option can either lead to a
good outcome (success) or to a bad outcome (failure). An investment in a new
product line can either be successful and realize a proﬁt, or it can be a failure
and incur a loss. Similarly, a physician can prescribe a type of medication
which either cures the patient or fails to do so.
In the examples given, the agent’s ability to select the proﬁt-maximizing
option for the principal depends on his qualiﬁcation. An agent who has in-
vested time and eﬀort into her qualiﬁcation at some earlier point in time is able
to identify the success probabilities of the available choice options. Therefore,
she can pick the choice-lottery that maximizes the principal’s expected proﬁt.
Instead, an ’unqualiﬁed’ agent will not be able to distinguish lotteries based
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on their outcomes and will therefore not be able to make a qualiﬁed choice.
For simplicity we assume that the unqualiﬁed agent realizes a bad outcome for
her principal every time she makes a choice. It follows that principals dislike
cooperating with unqualiﬁed agents, and that agents who have invested time
and eﬀort into their qualiﬁcation prefer not to be mistaken for unqualiﬁed
agents.
A further characteristic of this type of interaction is the availability of
conservative or ’defensive’ choices, which resemble a default option. In the
corporate setting, this means choosing a strategy which is already in place or
investing in a new project which is in line with the company’s existing business
plan. In the medical setting, a physician might order an additional commonly
used diagnostic test or choose a frequently prescribed type of medication over
a promising, innovative one. While these choices are not proﬁt-maximizing all
the time, they are not contested as being choices that a qualiﬁed agent would
make.
In the aftermath of an agent’s choice, the principal usually only receives
two types of information. First, he observes the choice outcome that is realized
for him (success or failure). In the simplest case, the principal can infer that
the agent was qualiﬁed if the outcome is a success and he incurs a positive
payoﬀ of some kind. But even if the realized outcome from the choice lottery
is bad, the principal can still recognize a qualiﬁed agent as long as a default
choice option was selected. While the principal does not know whether the
default option was the best choice available, he knows that only a qualiﬁed
agent could have chosen this option.
Hence, if the outcome from the choice option is bad and the agent didn’t
choose a default, it is impossible for the principal to distinguish whether the
agent was qualiﬁed and chose a non-default (alternative) option or whether
the agent was not qualiﬁed at all. In reality, the determination of an agent’s
qualiﬁcation is not only relevant to the principal, but also to legal authorities.
In case of conﬂict between principal and agent, legal authorities aim to assign
liability exclusively to agents who caused a negative outcome through a lack
of research, precaution or care.
The agent’s choice is therefore characterized by a trade-oﬀ between max-
imizing the principal’s expected payoﬀ on the one hand and by a desire to
signal his own quality. One way to signal quality is for the agent to choose
the default option, even if it is not the choice that maximizes the principal’s
expected payoﬀ. We abstract from various relevant factors, such as the mag-
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nitude of ﬁnancial liability, personal interaction, incentive wage contracts and
the possibility to build a reputation. Instead, we want to determine whether
defensive decision making can be motivated in a minimal signalling scenario.
2.2.2 Experimental Set-up
Before the ﬁrst stage of the experiment, all participants are randomly divided
into agents and principals and each agent is assigned to a principal. Each
agent’s choice in the main game has ﬁnancial consequences for his or her as-
signed principal. In order to increase the quantity of observations, all partic-
ipants make choices from the agent’s perspective and only learn about their
actual role at the end of the experiment. The experimental set-up is depicted
in Figure 2.1.
In the ﬁrst stage of the experiment, all participants perform a real eﬀort
task. The participants count the number of ones in a series of ﬁve-by-ﬁve
matrices, the aim is to report correct results for as many matrices as possi-
ble. The individual performance in the task determines whether the agent is
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awarded a qualiﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, the seven participants in a group of eight,
who solve the highest number of matrices become qualiﬁed. In each group one
participant out of eight remaines unqualiﬁed. The participants are instructed
about the qualiﬁcation procedure and about the consequences that obtaining
a qualiﬁcation has for the range of possible outcomes they can realize for their
principals.
In the second stage of the experiment the seven qualiﬁed agents in each
group are asked to choose among two diﬀerent lotteries (Option Y and Option
Z). Option Y and Option Z diﬀer in terms of the information the principal
receives. Option Z represents the default or the conservative choice option.
Irrespective of Option Z’s outcome, the principal receives the information that
the agent performed well in the real eﬀort task and subsequently selected
Option Z for the principal.
If Option Y is chosen, the principal only receives information if Option
Y is successful. In that case the principal learns that the agent earned a
qualiﬁcation and chose Option Y for his principal. If Option Y is not successful,
the principal is informed that he will not receive a payoﬀ.
Unqualiﬁed agents don’t make any choice – Option X is always implemented
for the principals of unqualiﬁed agents. Principals with Option X receive the
same message as in the case of a failed Option Y: namely that they will not
receive a payoﬀ.
Qualiﬁed agents make their choice between Option Y and Option Z by
means of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker, DeGroot,
and Marschak, 1964). Instead of selecting directly between Option Y and
Option Z, the agents are asked to state the lowest success probability, r, at
which they still prefer implementing the default, Option Z, over implementing
the alternative Option Y, which always has a success probability of 1/2. After
selecting r, a random number between zero and one, b, is drawn within the
BDM mechanism. If the random number, b, is smaller than the agent’s stated
minimum probability r, the alternative Option Y is implemented. If b is larger
than r, Option Z is implemented for the agent and his principal. The success
probability of Option Z in this case is equal to b. The stronger an agent’s
preference for the default choice option, the smaller should be the selected
value of r.
This decision mechanism was implemented to elicit the agent’s ’willingness
to pay’ for the signaling of qualiﬁcation that is associated with a failed Option
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Z, and that is not available with a failed Option Y. The unit of payment in this
case is the deviation from the optimal decision for the principal. The selected
value of r in the BDM mechanism provides an incentive-compatible measure
for defensive decision making.
In the third stage of the experiment the selected lotteries were realized and
the participants were informed about their role (agent or principal) and their
payoﬀ. Principal’s also received information about their agent’s qualiﬁcation
in case Option Z was realized.
We compare the results from this treatment to a baseline group, in which
there is no diﬀerence between Option Y and Option Z with respect to the
information that is signalled to the principal. As Option Y and Option Z are
similar, agents should not select values of r below 1/2. The baseline comparison
is necessary to verify that any reductions in r below 1/2, actually stemm from
the diﬀerence in information between Option Y and Option Z and that other
causes can be ruled out.
2.2.3 Hypotheses
Participants in the role of the agent who care for the well-being of the princi-
pal, but who are not interested in the beliefs of the principal regarding their
qualiﬁcation, are indiﬀerent between Option Z and Option Y (i.e. the default
treatment and the alternative treatment). Accordingly, in the BDM mecha-
nism, they should bid a success probability p “ 1{2. Agents in the treatment
condition who care about their principal’s belief might trade oﬀ the well- be-
ing of the principal against a favourable signal and the associated belief. They
would be willing to accept a lower value of r in order to increase the probabil-
ity of a favourable belief about their own qualiﬁcation. We have the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: More participants will choose p “ 1{2 in the baseline con-
dition than in the treatment condition.
Hypothesis 2: Of those participants who do not choose (almost) p “ 1{2,
the chosen values for r should be higher in the baseline condition.
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Furthermore, the social values of a participant might have an eﬀect on the
chosen value of r:
Hypothesis 3: We expect a positive eﬀect of pro-social or altruistic atti-
tude on the chosen level of r.
2.2.4 Conducting the Experiment
The experiment was conducted at the research laboratory of the Friedrich-
Schiller University in Jena, in cooperation with the Max-Planck Institute for
Economics. All 128 participants were recruited on-line via ORSEE (Greiner,
2015) and were students at the University of Jena. A total of 8 sessions took
place in June, July and December 2014. In each session half of the partici-
pants were allocated to the baseline group and the other half to the treatment
group. The experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), in
particular we constructed a graphical interface to better instruct the partic-
ipants about their range of possible inputs and the consequences. A sample
screenshot of the experiment can be found in Figure 2.3 in the Appendix. To
ensure that all participants could understand and apply the BDM mechanism,
we instructed the participants with the help of narrated video presentations8.
Each session consisted of six repetitions of the main game, participants were
re-matched in each round according to stranger-matching protocol. After six
rounds of the main game, the participants’ risk preferences according to Holt
and Laury (2002) were elicited and the social value orientation according to the
slider measure by Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf (2011) was recorded.
At the end of the experiment, one of these 6 rounds was randomly selected for
payment. Throughout the experiment, the participants could not communicate
with each other and principals and agents remained completely anonymous.
All subjects received a show-up fee of 2,50e as they entered the laboratory.
In addition to the show-up fee agents received a ﬂat payment of 100ECU “ˆ
10e at the end of the experiment. By design, this payment was independent
of the obtained qualiﬁcation, the selected choice option or the resulting payoﬀ
for the principal. In case a choice option was successful, the principal also
received a payoﬀ of 100ECU “ˆ 10e at the end of the experiment. If the
8 https://www.dropbox.com/sh/x4bd1inx9ait4y2/AACIVHD269sKSrmI1zsy9ovUa?dl=0
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selected option was not successful, the principal received no further payoﬀ
after the experiment.
2.3 Results
We present the results in two subsections. In the ﬁrst subsection, we provide
descriptive statistics, give a brief overview of self-reported behaviour from the
questionnaire and introduce personal characteristics with regard to social and
risk preferences. In the second subsection, we conduct a detailed evaluation of
the data to draw inference for testing the experimental hypotheses set out in
the previous section.
2.3.1 Descriptive statistics and self-reported behaviour
The sample comprises data from eight sessions with a total of 128 students
from several diﬀerent academic backgrounds. In each session, six rounds of
the main game were played, followed by two post tests and a questionnaire.
Each session lasted approximately 55 minutes and subjects earned on average
7.40e + 2.50e (show-up fee). Approximately 48% of the participants were
female and the average age of the participants age was approximately 24 years.
In the qualiﬁcation task, participants attempted to solve on average a
higher number of matrices in the treatment group (22 matrices), as compared
to the baseline group (21 matrices). Of those attempted, an average of 19 ma-
trices were solved correctly in the treatment group and 18 matrices were solved
correctly in the baseline group. The diﬀerence in performance is depicted in
the left panel of Figure 2.2.9
The right panel of Figure 2.2 depicts an ecdf-plot of the participant’s mini-
mum required success probability for preferring Option Z over Option Y in the
baseline and in the treatment group. The observed level of the variable ranged
from 0% to 100%, with a slightly lower average in the treatment group (48.5%)
as compared to the baseline group (48.8%). While the graph clearly indicates
9The graph does not depict two extreme outliers (59, 73) in the group of attempted ma-
trices. In both cases participants did not actually count the number of ones, but repeatedly
entered one answer, as quickly as possible.
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that participants in treatment and baseline group are mostly indiﬀerent be-
tween the two options and largely make optimal choices for their principals,
we still observe a considerable number of deviations from the optimal choice to
both sides of the distribution. A total of 31.8% of all decisions in the treatment
group and 34.9% of the decisions in the baseline group deviate by more than
10% from the optimal choice. Contrary to our theory, defensive behaviour
also seems to be more prevalent in the baseline group than in the treatment
group. A further feature of the depicted minimum success probabilities (r) in
Figure 2.2 is that they diverge from the optimal point (1/2) in both directions.
This is striking as there seems to be no obvious advantage for the agent, from
increasing r beyond 1/2. Under the assumption that participants have under-
stood the game and are not spiteful towards their principal, the only other
explanation is that this divergence serves as a signalling mechanism as well.
As all participants have full information about the possible strategies in the
game, they also know about the possibility to reduce the principal’s success
probability in order to implement the signal-generating Option Z. As a conse-
quence, they might actually want to avoid Option Z, as it could be understood
as a signal for defensive behaviour. Therefore, for the remainder of the paper
we will treat divergences in both directions as instances of defensive behaviour.
Figure 2.2 Performance in the RET and choices in the main task, by treat-
ment
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To gain an impression of the participants’ understanding of the BDM mech-
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anism from the video instructions, all participants were asked to report their
subjective level of understanding on a scale from 0 to 100. On average, the
participants reported to have had a good understanding (84/100) of the main
task. In addition, participants were also asked to report on their behaviour
during the main game in a questionnaire. The explicit wording of the ques-
tions, as well as the results can be found in Table 2.6 in the Appendix. On
average the participants reported that performing well in the initial task was
very important to them (81/100) and that they felt a considerable degree of
responsibility towards their principal (71/100). While participants reported
to be only mildly interested in signalling their qualiﬁcation (33/100), 69% re-
ported discomfort in case their principal would not receive a further payoﬀ
at the end of the experiment. Anonymity towards the principal mattered for
slightly less than half the participants (38%) and choices may have been some-
what diﬀerent if the agents faced meeting their principals at the end of the
experiment (36/100).
As the main task focuses on making risky, payoﬀ-relevant choices for an-
other person, we have also recorded risk preferences according to Holt and
Laury (2002) and social preferences and elicited social preferences according
to the ring measure as devised by Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf (2011)
and implemented for z-Tree by Crosetto, Weisel, and Winter (2012). We ﬁnd
representative values for both measures: the majority of the participants ex-
hibit slight risk aversion, 79 participants exhibit individualistic preferences, 48
have pro-social preferences and one participant has competitive preferences.
Both measures are depicted in Figure 2.4 in the Appendix.
2.3.2 Detailed Analysis
Performance in the real eﬀort task As discussed earlier, the left panel
of Figure 2.2 shows that subjects in the baseline group solve slightly fewer
matrices in the real eﬀort task than participants in the treatment group. The
diﬀerence is, however, not large. To more formally assess the diﬀerence between
treatment and baseline we assume that each participant solves problems at an
approximately constant rate. In this case the total number of problems solved
follows a Poisson process. Hence, we estimate the following Poisson regression
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Table 2.1: Estimation of Equations (2.1)–(2.4) for attempted problems.
Mean 2.5% 97.5% psrf sseﬀ
λBase. 3.00 2.89 3.11 1.0043 622
λTreat. 3.10 2.99 3.21 1.0032 559
λTreat. ´ λBase. 0.10 -0.06 0.26 1.0021 604
τ1 23.25 16.13 32.38 1.0002 9026
τ2 88.25 18.09 263.89 1.0012 1969
Table 2.2: Estimation of Equations (2.1)–(2.4) for correctly solved problems.
Mean 2.5% 97.5% psrf sseﬀ
λBase. 2.84 2.69 2.97 1.0921 420
λTreat. 2.92 2.80 3.05 1.0125 510
λTreat. ´ λBase. 0.09 -0.09 0.28 1.0409 516
τ1 11.82 8.30 16.22 1.0014 7680
τ2 80.74 10.84 280.33 1.0148 1708
with random eﬀects for each individual and for each matching group:
Y „ P pexppλT ` ν1,s ` ν2,gqq (2.1)
λT „ Np0, .0001q (2.2)
for k P t1, 2u : νk,¨ „ Np0, τkq (2.3)
τk „ Γpm2k{d2k,mk{d2kq, mk „ Γp1, 1q, dk „ Γp1, 1q (2.4)
P , N , and Γ are the Poisson, Normal, and Gamma distribution, respec-
tively. Y is the number of problems, λT is the arrival parameter for treatment
T (baseline or treatment), ν1,s is a random eﬀect for participant s, ν2,g is a
random eﬀect for the matching group g.
Estimation results, based on vague priors, are shown in Table 2.1 and
in Table 2.2 for the number of attempted problems and for the number of
correctly solved problems, respectively. In both cases the number of problems
is slightly larger in the treatment condition, but the 95%-credible interval
includes positive as well as negative values.
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Result 1 (Qualiﬁcation): Participants in the treatment condition invest
slightly more in obtaining a qualiﬁcation, as compared to the baseline.
Willingness to accept risk The right panel of Figure 2.4 in the Appendix
displays the chosen success probabilities r for the baseline and treatment group.
Indeed, a large group of players bid a success probability r close to 1{2. To
formally assess the diﬀerence between the baseline group and the treatment
group, we use a mixture model where r is drawn from a Normal distribution
with small variance (large precision) or from a Normal distribution with a
larger variance (small precision).
rs,t „ NpμT,ks ` ν1,s ` ν2,g ` X, τksq (2.5)
ks „ dbernppT q, pT „ Betap1, 1q (2.6)
for k P t1, 2u : μT,k „ Np50, .001q with μTreat.,2 “ μBase.,2 (2.7)
for k P t1 . . . 4u : τk „ Γpm2k{d2k,mk{d2kq, mk „ Γp1, 1q, dk „ Γp1, 1q, τ1 ă τ2
(2.8)
ν1,s „ Np0, τ3 ¨ τ1{τkq and ν2,g „ Np0, τ4 ¨ Ipk “ 1qq (2.9)
Here rs,t is the minimum acceptable success probability for subject s in period
t of the experiment, ks is the classiﬁcation of the subject into distribution 1
(wide) or 2 (narrow), and μT,k and τk determine the shape of the two distri-
butions for treatment T P tBase.,Treat.u and classiﬁcation k. As before we
include random eﬀects ν1,s for the subject s and ν2,g for the matching group g.
Below we will also include controls X, but for the time being we have X “ 0.
We scale the precision of the random eﬀect for subjects depending on the clas-
siﬁcation proportional to the precision of μT,k. For simplicity we only include
a random eﬀect for groups for participants from the wide classiﬁcation.
Estimation results are shown in Table 2.3. The model, indeed, classiﬁes par-
ticipants quite clearly. There is one narrow distribution with mean 50.1 with a
precision of 48.8 and a wide distribution with means 48.5 or 46.8 depending on
the treatment. The precision of the latter distributions is considerably smaller,
only 0.00606.
Our estimation classiﬁes participants into those choosing values of r very
close to 1{2 and those deviating from 1{2. This classiﬁcation is actually very
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Table 2.3: Estimation of Equations (2.5–2.9)
Mean 2.5% 97.5% psrf sseﬀ
pBase. 0.42 0.30 0.54 1.0000 40314
pTreat. 0.49 0.37 0.61 1.0000 39313
pBase. ´ pTreat. -0.07 -0.24 0.10 1.0000 40070
μBase.,1 48.46 41.50 55.18 1.0011 1562
μTreat.,1 46.81 39.71 53.76 1.0012 1587
μBase.,2 “ μTreat.,2 50.10 50.04 50.16 1.0015 1698
μBase.,1 ´ μTreat.,1 -1.66 -11.48 8.38 1.0015 1539
τ1 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.0004 15790
τ2 49.02 40.84 58.96 1.0015 4156
τS 24.19 17.36 32.45 1.0001 13451
τG 1.35 0.02 5.12 1.0145 1269
clear. 1 percent of the subjects are perfectly classiﬁed, i.e. in 40000 diﬀerent
samples the same participant always goes into the same category.
Let us ﬁrst look at Hypothesis 1. For the baseline group, a relative fraction
of 0.42 of players is classiﬁed as from the narrow distribution (close to r “ 1{2).
In contrast to Hypothesis 1, the fraction of 0.492 for the treatment group is
actually larger than for the baseline group.
Result 2 (Hypothesis 1): We ﬁnd that the propotion of participants who
choose r “ 1{2 is slightly larger in the treatment group, compared with the
baseline.
Let us next look at Hypothesis 2. We expected that μTreat.,1 ą μBase.,1. This
is conﬁrmed by the estimation. The diﬀerence is, however, not large. The 95%
credible interval for μBase.,1 ´ μTreat.,1 includes positive and negative values.
Result 3 (Hypothesis 2): We ﬁnd that the average level of r is slightly
higher in the baseline group, compared with the treatment.
Controlling for performance Let us next investigate the impact of het-
erogeneity in performance in the real-eﬀort task. The direction of the expected
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Table 2.4: Estimation of Equations (2.5)–(2.9) including performance in the
real eﬀort task
Mean 2.5% 97.5% psrf sseﬀ
pBase. 0.42 0.30 0.54 1.0001 40281
pTreat. 0.49 0.37 0.61 1.0000 38694
pBase. ´ pTreat. -0.07 -0.24 0.10 1.0000 39706
μBase.,1 48.07 41.54 54.59 1.0016 1702
μTreat.,1 46.56 39.62 53.55 1.0018 1644
μBase.,2 “ μTreat.,2 50.09 50.04 50.15 1.0021 1787
μBase.,1 ´ μTreat.,1 -1.52 -11.26 8.11 1.0014 1638
βperf.Base. -0.15 -0.97 0.68 1.0002 6065
βperf.Treat. -0.41 -1.27 0.45 1.0003 9202
τ1 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.0001 15886
τ2 48.74 40.73 58.16 1.0024 6694
τS 24.79 17.73 33.28 1.0001 14296
τG 1.39 0.03 5.36 1.0056 1602
eﬀect is not quite clear. It is possible that subjects who have worked harder
and have solved more problems in the real eﬀort task have a bigger incentive
to behave in a defensive manner, as their qualiﬁcation was more costly than
that of the below-average achievers.
Alternatively, performance in the real eﬀort task might simply be an in-
strument with which the true intention of the individual can be determined.
Those who solved the most tasks genuinely cared about the outcome for their
principal, and accordingly also avoided defensive choices in the next stage of
the game. Those who mainly cared about the signal they sent only had an
incentive to work slightly more than the lowest performer in the group, and
subsequently engaged in defensive behaviour, to signal their quality.
To study this question more formally, we set the control variable from
Equation (2.5) to X “ βT,k ¨ P where P is the performance.
Estimation results are shown in Table 2.4. We ﬁnd that performance in the
real eﬀort task has a small negative eﬀect on the chosen success probability r.
For both the treatment group and the baseline group, the 95% credible interval
contains positive and negative values. Also, the diﬀerence between the eﬀects
can be positive as well as negative. We also see that estimates for p and μ do
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Table 2.5: Estimation of Equations (2.5)–(2.9) including social value orienta-
tion and risk
Mean 2.5% 97.5% psrf sseﬀ
pBase. 0.42 0.30 0.54 1.0000 40000
pTreat. 0.49 0.37 0.61 1.0000 36837
pBase. ´ pTreat. -0.07 -0.24 0.10 1.0000 38949
μBase.,1 47.88 41.07 54.62 1.0033 1562
μTreat.,1 46.85 39.91 53.97 1.0017 1580
μBase.,2 “ μTreat.,2 50.10 50.04 50.16 1.0022 1626
μBase.,1 ´ μTreat.,1 -1.03 -10.77 8.57 1.0034 1573
βrisk 0.24 -0.14 0.63 1.0038 1735
βsvo 0.76 -1.45 2.98 1.0010 1920
τ1 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.0001 16464
τ2 48.56 40.64 57.94 1.0003 6643
τS 23.66 16.77 31.84 1.0001 11222
τG 1.31 0.02 5.41 1.0052 1290
not change much as compared to Table 2.3.
Controlling for risk and social value orientation Let us next check the
impact of risk aversion and social value orientation. To do this, we use as a
control in Equation (2.5) X “ βsvo ` svo` βrisk ` risk, where svo is the critical
value from the Holt and Laury (2002) task and risk the social value orientation.
Table 2.5 shows the estimation results. We see that the credible interval
for risk aversion and social values includes both positive and negative values.
We also see that estimates for p and μ do not change much as compared to
Table 2.3 and 2.4. Therefore we cannot conﬁrm Hypothesis 3.
Result 4 (Hypothesis 3): Social value orientation does not seem to aﬀect
the selected level of r.
18
2.4 Discussion
We have presented the results of an experiment we conducted to investigate
whether defensive behaviour in principal-agent relationships can be eroded
by merely removing ﬁnancial liability, or whether it persists as a means of
signalling qualiﬁcation. We compared two scenarios, one (our baseline) where
participants in the experiment have no reason to make a defensive investment,
and another (our treatment) where those participants who care about the
beliefs of the player to whom they are matched in the experiment would make
a defensive investment.
We use the strategy vector method to elicit choices in the experiment.
There are two ways how an eﬀect could be measured in the experiment: as
the fraction of players who choose a strategy r close to 1{2 in our experiment
and by the amount of deviation from r “ 1{2. In both dimensions we did
not ﬁnd a substantial eﬀect in our experiment. This result does not change
when we control for performance in the real eﬀort task, for risk aversion or for
social values. Therefore, we were unable to establish a lower benchmark for
the emergence of defensive behaviour.
If we apply this speciﬁc result to the practical domain, it means that we
should not expect agents to engage in defensive behaviour to signal information
about their qualiﬁcation. While this result sounds like good news to all those
who work on curtailing defensive behaviour, we need to keep in mind that
we have studied a scenario where the incentive for a defensive investment was
extremely weak. In this minimal scenario, the only reason to make such an
investment is to control the beliefs of an anonymously matched other player.
We purposely abstracted away from all other reasons for defensive investments,
such as a repeated interaction with the principal, the fear of litigation or the
variation in social distance to the aﬀected principal.
In particular, establishing anonymity between the principals and the agents
distinguishes the experimental results from the real world examples we referred
to earlier: business managers, lawyers and especially physicians, who all have
closer relationships with their respective principals. The reduced social dis-
tance is believed to increase incentives for taking or at least signalling beneﬁcial
decisions for the principal. Experimental evidence by Bohnet and Frey (1999)
shows that dictators make signiﬁcantly more generous oﬀers to the recipient if
the latter can be identiﬁed by the dictator. Furthermore, the authors ﬁnd that
the proportion of dictators who chose an equal division increased much further
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when the recipient could also identify the dictator. (Charness and Gneezy,
2008) conﬁrm that dictators make more generous oﬀers when they can iden-
tify the recipient, but also show that this type of increased charity is crowded
out by strategic considerations in the ultimatum game.
The experimental evidence suggests that eliminating anonymity in the ex-
periment would generate a more salient incentive for using defensive decision
making as a signalling mechanism in the treatment group. By removing social
distance, participants in the treatment group would experience more negative
feelings when they are mistaken for unqualiﬁed agents and would choose to
deviate from the optimal choice more frequently and to a larger extent. The
results from the questionnaire conﬁrm this intuition. Participants felt a con-
siderable level of responsibility for their principal and reported discomfort in
case the principal left the experiment without receiving a pay-oﬀ. A consider-
able proportion of the participants also indicated that the provided anonymity
in the experiment aﬀected their decision and that their choice would be dif-
ferent in a scenario in which they would meet their assigned principal at the
end of the experiment. Similarly, the pressure from building a reputation for
repeated interactions or from signalling in a selection process are also expected
to fortify the treatment eﬀect. A replication of the experiment under two-way
identiﬁcation is therefore expected to increase external validity, as well as the
strength of the observed eﬀect and is suggested for further research.
2.5 Conclusion
In this experimental study, we have investigated whether defensive behaviour
in principal-agent relationships can be eroded by removing ﬁnancial liability or
whether it persists as a means of signalling qualiﬁcation. In order to establish
a lower benchmark for the willingness to engage in defensive behaviour, we
compared two scenarios in which agents have or don’t have an incentive to make
defensive investments in order to signal information about their qualiﬁcation
to their allocated principals.
We cannot conﬁrm that agents in the incentive-free group choose the op-
timal decision for the principal more often. While the diversion from the
optimum is slightly smaller in the incentive-free group, this diﬀerence is not
signiﬁcant. Finally, we do not ﬁnd these results to change when we control for
performance in the real eﬀort task, for risk aversion or for social values.
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2.6 Appendix
Table 2.6: Results from the questionnaire
Self-reported understanding Observed range Mean
p0 ´ 100q
"Do you feel that you understood
the instructions and the 0 ´ 100 84
experiment?"
Importance of qualiﬁcation
p0 ´ 100q
"How important was it for you to
solve the initial task success- 0 ´ 100 81
fully?"
Importance of signalling
p0 ´ 100q
"How important was it to you that
the second player would receive 0 ´ 100 33
information about your performance
in the real eﬀort task?"
Discomfort with bad outcome Observed answers Percentage "Yes"
Yes/ No
"Would you feel uncomfortable if
you didn’t realize an additional Yes/NO 69%
payout for your second player?"
Anonymity
Yes/ No
"Was your decision aﬀected by the
condition of anonymity towards the Yes/NO 38%
other player?"
No Anonymity Observed range Mean
p0 ´ 100q
"How much more important would it
have been for you to signal your 0 ´ 100 36
performance in the initial task, if
the other player was personally
introduced to you at the end?"
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Figure 2.3 Sample Screen of the Decision Screen in the Experiment
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Figure 2.4 Risk preferences and social preferences in the sample
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Chapter 3
To Comply or Not to Comply:
The Eﬀect of Changes in Standard
Variability on Behavior
Abstract: Doctrinal lawyers strive to reduce legal uncertainty based on the
premise that socially desirable activities are stiﬂed when legal consequences
are diﬃcult to predict. Instead, economic theory of law suggests that in-
creasing legal uncertainty can be socially beneﬁcial. We test in a laboratory
experiment whether increasing the variability of an exogenous choice threshold
(legal standard) increases or reduces socially desirable behaviour. The results
indicate a U-shaped relationship between increases in variability and activity
choices: increases in variability ﬁrst induce choice levels below the optimum
(overcompliance), but eventually lead to choices above the optimum (under-
compliance). Moreover, increasing variability gradually crowds-out compliant
choices. Finally, in the experiment minimal variability of the legal standard
induces erratic individual behaviour beyond socially satisfactory levels such
that the standard loses its coordination function.
Keywords: legal uncertainty; vague legal standard; overcompliance and under-
compliance; experimental law and economics; compliance crowding-out
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3.1 Introduction
In settings of legal uncertainty, a person faces diﬃculties to perfectly predict
how a judge or public administration oﬃcial will apply the law (e.g.: Popelier,
2000; Raitio, 2008). Which legal consequence will realize remains unclear in the
sense that possible consequences are associated with some residual probability
of occurring. For example, when an informed prediction yields a 90% chance
of either winning or losing at trial, how the law will be applied is quite fore-
seeable. In this case, legal uncertainty is low. By contrast, given a 50%-level
of predictability of either outcome, the legal consequence resulting from trial
is not at all foreseeable. In this case, legal uncertainty is highest (D’Amato,
1983).
Theoretical conﬂict exists between doctrinal legal scholars and economists
regarding the eﬀects of legal uncertainty on rule-subjected individuals. On
the one hand, an argument in doctrinal legal scholarship holds that diﬃcult-
to-predict legal consequences can crowd-out socially beneﬁcial activities. This
argument relates back to Max Weber’s theory on legalism (Trubek, 1972; We-
ber, 1978). Consequently, doctrinal legal scholars on both sides of the Atlantic
advocate reducing legal uncertainty (see e.g.: D’Amato, 1983; Popelier, 2000;
Maxeiner, 2006, 2007; Raitio, 2008; Smits, 2012). On the other hand, results
from economic theory reveal that increasing legal uncertainty can encourage
socially beneﬁcial activities. For instance, increases in the vagueness of a le-
gal standard may reduce excessively compliant behaviour that is ineﬃcient
(Craswell and Calfee, 1986). As another example, legal uncertainty can act as
selective deterrent that discourages controversial actions while stimulating so-
cially beneﬁcial activities (Lang, 2014). Compared to their lawyer colleagues,
economists emphasize optimal rule design and suggest that reducing legal un-
certainty at all costs is not desirable.
In this article, we provide insight into the discussion about the eﬀects of
legal uncertainty on activity choices in three steps. First, we elaborate on the
concept of legal uncertainty that we employ throughout our study. We do so by
revisiting Craswell and Calfee (1986)’s model that analyses a person’s activity
choice under a vague legal standard. The vague legal standard is stochastic in
the sense that it is drawn from a known probability distribution. Accordingly,
there is a chance of false positives and false negatives, i.e., a court may mis-
takenly exonerate a noncompliant person or erroneously sanction a compliant
person (see also: Kaplow, 1994). Changes in the dispersion of the probabil-
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ity distribution reﬂect diﬀerent degrees of standard vagueness. As a result,
Craswell and Calfee (1986) predict overcompliance at small degrees of legal
vagueness, but that behaviour reverts to eﬃciency as standards become less
predictable. The authors identify a U-shaped relationship between standard
vagueness and activity choices such that increases in standard vagueness can
actually reduce ineﬃcient overcompliance. Second, we update the model’s as-
sumptions about a person’s preference structure. We show that the doctrinal
perspective on the discussion can be accommodated within the same model.
Finally, to falsify either of the ensuing perspectives, we study individual be-
haviour under vague legal standards in a controlled laboratory experiment.
In the experiment, 137 participants indicated an activity choices by posi-
tioning a slider. After their slider choice, we simulate a vague legal standard
by drawing a choice threshold from a normal distribution known to the par-
ticipants. If a participant’s slider choice was lower than the choice threshold,
she was paid according to a payoﬀ function reﬂecting her private beneﬁt from
the slider choice. If the slider choice was greater than the choice threshold,
however, the participant had to return a speciﬁed amount of her private bene-
ﬁt and, thus, received a lower payoﬀ than otherwise. To experimentally reﬂect
diﬀerent degrees of standard vagueness as measure of legal uncertainty, the
experiment varied between subjects the standard deviation of the distribution
determining the choice threshold. The experiment comprised six treatment
groups with increasing degrees of standard vagueness.1
Our main results support the standard economic model of Craswell and
Calfee (1986): a suﬃciently low level of standard vagueness on average in-
duces overcompliance; after a tipping point, however, a further increase of
standard vagueness reduces and, eventually, eliminates overcompliant choices.
Ineﬃciently overcompliant choices only obtain under low standard vagueness.
Otherwise, activity choices under substantial standard vagueness are statisti-
cally indistinguishable from those under near absence of standard vagueness.
Moreover, our data reveals important auxiliary results. First, the share of
compliant (as opposed to non-compliant) choices gradually reduces with in-
creasing standard vagueness. Second, as soon as standard vagueness exceeds
the quasi-certain level, the share of socially desirable (as opposed to socially
undesirable) choices sharply drops—to the extent that socially undesirable
choices far outweigh socially desirable choices.
1 Although the notion is contested that data from ﬁeld experiments is more realistic
(e.g.: Falk and Heckman, 2009), we acknowledge that the advantages of controlled laboratory
experiments may come at the price of reduced external validity.
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With this chapter, we primarily contribute to previous research on negli-
gence liability (e.g.: Shavell, 1980; Landes and Posner, 1981; Kahan, 1989), in
general, and on the eﬀect of vague legal standards (e.g.: Craswell and Calfee,
1986; Lang, 2014), in particular. In this respect, we provide experimental
evidence on how standard vagueness aﬀects the activity choice.
In addition, our study relates to other research streams. First, our results
speak to diﬀerent contributions in the deterrence literature. The deterrence
hypothesis involves that criminal actions decrease in the probability of punish-
ment (seminal: Becker, 1968). Experimental tests of the deterrence hypothesis
mostly uncover conﬁrmatory evidence (e.g.: Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner,
2002; DeAngelo and Charness, 2012; Rizzolli and Stanca, 2012; Schildberg-
Hörisch and Strassmair, 2012; Khadjavi, 2015). These studies, however, only
use point values as exogenous detection probabilities. By contrast, we employ
an endogenous and dynamic detection probability that depends on a person’s
choice. Thereby we allow potential oﬀenders to self-select into a tolerable de-
tection probability. In addition, our study is not driven to achieve maximum
deterrence, but rather optimal deterrence. Moreover, regarding deterrence re-
searchers have suggested that accuracy is a method of increasing deterrence
because fewer legal errors increase the disincentives to commit harmful acts
(e.g. Kaplow, 1994; Polinsky and Shavell, 1989). Our results, however, indicate
a non-monotonic relationship between accuracy and activity choice. Second,
our results provide novel experimental evidence for the rules versus standards
debate. A common argument is that ex ante uncertainty endemic in stan-
dards can lead to undesirable behaviour. Speciﬁcally, risk-averse persons may
forego socially desirable actions when exposed to an uncertain standard (e.g.:
Kaplow, 1992; Korobkin, 2000). Our results indicate that the amount of fore-
gone actions depends on the degree of standard vagueness. In fact, even after
controlling for risk attitudes our participants do not signiﬁcantly forego de-
sirable actions in any treatment. Thus our results invalidate the argument
against using standards in lieu of rules.
Section 3.2 derives predictions based on a formal model. Section 3.3 dis-
cusses the experimental design. Section 3.4 analyses the the data and reports
the ensuing results. Section 3.5 discusses our ﬁndings before Section 3.6 con-
cludes.
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3.2 Theory & predictions
We derive predictions from a formal model that builds upon previous work of
Craswell and Calfee (1986). We start by setting up the model and reviewing
Craswell and Calfee (1986)’s results. We then add behavioural modiﬁcations
to the original model.
Suppose a rational, fundamentally self-interested person can engage in an
activity x with x P r0, x¯s, where x¯ is some upper natural or technological
boundary. Exercising activity x is proﬁtable for the person. Let bpxq represent
these beneﬁts and assume bpxq to be twice diﬀerentiable and concave, i.e.,
b1pxq ą 0, b2pxq ď 0. Moreover, engaging in activity x imposes costs on
others. Let epxq denote this negative externality and assume epxq to be twice
diﬀerentiable and convex, i.e., e1pxq ą 0, e2pxq ě 0.
Further suppose a lawmaker or judge wants to regulate activity x by setting
a legal standard xL with xL ă x¯. The legal standard xL is a maximum stan-
dard: when a person chooses 0 ď x ď xL she is compliant; when she chooses
xL ă x ď x¯ she violates the legal standard. For instance, think of xL as a
speed limit, maximum working hours per week, or a cap on noise pollution.
Moreover, assume that courts will hold a person violating xL fully liable for
the costs that her choice of x imposes on others. When non-compliant, she has
to pay damages dpxq that perfectly compensate for the negative externality,
i.e., dpxq “ epxq.2
Assume that the legal standard is set at the amount of activity x that
maximizes social welfare, i.e., xL “ xS. Formally, xS solves the problem
maxx
“
bpxq ´ epxq‰ and thus satisﬁes the condition b1pxq “ e1pxq. Following
Craswell and Calfee (1986), we can thus deﬁne over- and undercompliance
relative to the socially optimal amount of activity x. When a person chooses
x ă xS, from a societal perspective she practices too little of activity x. She
is overcompliant. Conversely, when a person chooses x ą xS, she carries out
too much of activity x. She is undercompliant. Both overcompliance and
undercompliance are socially undesirable because any choice x ‰ xS leads to
a welfare loss.
At least since Brown (1973), negligence models mostly assume legal cer-
tainty in that they rely on a precise, deterministic legal standard (e.g.: Shavell,
2 Because dpxq “ epxq, for the remainder of the chapter we will not further diﬀerentiate
between damages and external costs and use epxq for convenience.
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1980; Landes and Posner, 1981; Grady, 1983; Kahan, 1989). By contrast, we
model a stochastic legal standard to represent standard vagueness as one va-
riety of legal uncertainty. A person who chooses x knows that with increasing
x there is the probability P pxL ă xq “ F pxq, with F 1pxq ą 0, that a court
will hold her in violation of the legal standard. Conversely, with probability
P pxL ě xq “ 1 ´ F pxq a court will ﬁnd a person in compliance with the le-
gal standard. While the standard is objectively determined ex post by judges
or administrative oﬃcials, the stochastic nature of the ex ante perception of
xL may result from the varying and possibly erroneous interpretation of the
standard. Ex ante the standard is therefore perceived as vaguely distributed
around a most likely mean. Formally, assume that F pxq is a cumulative dis-
tribution function with
F pxq ”
xż
0
fptq dt,
where fpxq ” F 1pxq is the associated probability density function. As func-
tional form, we assume that xL is normally distributed around the socially
optimal level xS, i.e., xL ∼ N pxS, σq,3. Thus we denote the ensuing probabil-
ity as Φpxq and its ﬁrst derivative as φpxq.
This modelling step corresponds with the way in which legal scholars have
conceptualized legal uncertainty. Legally relevant decisions concern an in-
formed prediction of how the courts will apply the law when presented with
some dispute (cf.: Holmes, 1897; Popelier, 2000; Raitio, 2008). Legal uncer-
tainty thus creates a prediction problem and legal uncertainty can be under-
stood as a
“situation that obtains when the rule that is relevant to a given act or
transaction is said [...] to have an expected [...] outcome at or near the
0.5 level of predictability” (D’Amato, 1983, p. 2).4
3 As a robustness check, Figure 3.5 in 3.7.1 illustrates predictions when xL is uniformly
distributed. Changing the underlying distribution does not change the basic analytical
results and hypotheses.
4 This needs to be clearly diﬀerentiated from another, operationally diﬀerent deﬁnition of
legal uncertainty. Legal uncertainty can be understood as a situation that emerges when the
legal system contains at least one legal problem whose correct solution is undeterminable,
e.g., a case that cannot be decided in an identiﬁably and uniquely correct way. In this sense,
Dworkin (1977, p. 286) speaks of “ties”.
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In this sense, a legal rule aﬀects a person’s behaviour to the extent that the
person perceives the uncertainty of being found in violation or in compliance
with the rule. In the present model, a higher σ implies a larger interval around
the legal standard xL “ xS that yields a prediction close to the 0.5 level of being
found either violating or complying with the legal standard. Put diﬀerently,
the location of the legal standard becomes less predictable with increasing σ.
Measures of dispersion of the underlying probability distribution of the legal
standard then reﬂect the degree of standard vagueness and legal uncertainty.
As we assume that probability distributions are known, our approach to
modelling “legal uncertainty” is incommensurate with how economists think
about uncertainty. Economists understand uncertainty as risk that is immea-
surable: an event is uncertain if it may or may not happen in the future and
the probabilities of the event occurring or not are unknown (Knight, 1921).
Technically, this model of legal uncertainty concerns risky decision-making be-
cause probabilities are known for each choice x. This approach is in line with
the conceptualization of legal uncertainty in legal scholarship, however. More-
over, recent research in law and economics not only studies legal uncertainty
as Knightian uncertainty (e.g.: Schildberg-Hörisch and Strassmair, 2012) but
also utilizes known probability distributions (e.g.: Lang, 2014).
3.2.1 Standard preferences & risk-neutral persons
To specify a person’s preference structure, we initially consider a risk-neutral
person who derives utility from her choice of x according to the utility function
uRN
`
x
˘ “
#
bpxq for x ď xL (compliance)
bpxq ´ epxq for x ą xL (violation) . (3.1)
As outcome x ą xL occurs with probability Φpxq, for any choice of x her
expected utility is
URN
`
x
˘ “ bpxq ´ Φpxq epxq. (3.2)
Because we assume utility to be piecewise linear in wealth, URN
`
x
˘
coincides
with the expected value of net beneﬁts. This formulation is equal to the original
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optimization problem of Craswell and Calfee (1986)’s risk-neutral agent. This
congruence deserves emphasis because Craswell and Calfee (1986) did not make
their agent’s utility function explicit – with important consequences for the
extension to risk-averse agents (see 3.7.2).
To understand a risk-neutral person’s incentives at the socially optimal
level xS, we diﬀerentiate URN
`
x
˘
with respect to x
BURN
`
x
˘
Bx “ b
1pxq ´ φpxq epxq ´ Φpxq e1pxq (3.3)
and evaluate this result at the social optimum xS where b1pxq “ e1pxq
BURN
`
x
˘
Bx
∣
∣
∣
xS
“ `1 ´ ΦpxSq˘ b1pxSq ´ φpxSq epxSq. (3.4)
The ﬁrst term of expression (3.4) describes the gains for the potential defen-
dant from marginally increasing x. The marginal beneﬁts are discounted by
the probability 1 ´ ΦpxSq that a person is found compliant. The second term
of expression (3.4) represents the oﬀsetting eﬀect identiﬁed by Craswell and
Calfee (1986). Marginal increases in x also increase the probability of being
held liable. A utility maximizing person has an incentive to choose an in-
dividually optimal amount x˚ ă xS (overcompliance) when expression (3.4)
is negative and an incentive to choose an individually optimal level x˚ ą xS
(undercompliance) when expression (3.4) is positive.
As a formal extension to Craswell and Calfee (1986), we derive from (3.3)
the eﬀect of standard vagueness on a person’s optimal choice xR˚N by
BURN
`
xR˚N
˘
BxR˚N
!“ 0
and get xR˚N “ xR˚Npσq.5 That is, the individually optimal choice xR˚N is a
function of the vagueness measure σ. The response function describes a risk-
neutral person’s optimal choice given a speciﬁc degree of standard vagueness.
5 A mathematical solution to derive xR˚N pσq is not possible because Φpxq has no closed
form representation. Therefore, we simulate the diﬀerent response functions in Figure 3.1
using the software environment R. For speciﬁcation and parametrization of all underlying
functions, see 3.7.3.
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The dashed line in Figure 3.1 on page 33 illustrates the relation between xR˚N
and σ. The ordinate of the graph in Figure 3.1 represents the individually
optimal choice x˚ relative to the socially optimal level xS and the legal stan-
dard xL. The abscissa of the graph represents σ as a measure of vagueness
of the legal standard. The response function xR˚Npσq resembles the charac-
teristic pattern identiﬁed by Craswell and Calfee (1986): a suﬃciently low
level of σ initially induces overcompliance; an increase of standard vagueness
beyond a tipping point, however, reduces overcompliance; eventually, overcom-
pliance turns into undercompliant individually optimal choices. Two notewor-
thy results emerge. First, reducing standard vagueness does not necessarily
improve the compliance decision. The diﬀerence between x˚ and xS describes
how much individually optimal behaviour deviates from socially optimal be-
haviour. Despite a reduction in standard vagueness, this diﬀerence increases
when standard vagueness is suﬃciently high.6 Second, a speciﬁc degree of
standard vagueness σ˚ ą 0 leads to socially optimal compliance decisions, i.e.,
xR˚Npσ˚q “ xR˚Np0q “ xS. When a precise standard is impossible to implement,
the existence of σ˚ implies that increasing (reducing) the degree of standard
vagueness can be socially beneﬁcial given initially overcompliant (undercom-
pliant) behaviour.
3.2.2 Standard preferences & risk-averse persons
We are interested in the behavioural consequences of legal uncertainty and ex-
tend the analysis by gradually incorporating or modifying assumptions about
how a person decides. Our ﬁrst behavioural modiﬁcation concerns risk at-
titude. Instead of assuming that a person is risk-neutral, we assume that a
person exhibits risk aversion. We continue to model society as risk-neutral
regarding the social beneﬁts and costs from activity x. Therefore, the socially
optimal amount xS remains unchanged.7
6 Given a reduction in σ, the diﬀerence between x˚ and xS may especially increase when
the legal standard is not distributed around the socially optimal level. See Craswell and
Calfee (1986) for an extensive analysis within the risk-neutral framework. We do not test
this case.
7 We deviate here from Craswell and Calfee (1986) who assume that society is only risk-
neutral regarding the social costs of a person’s activity and that, therefore, xS is determined
by solving maxx
“
u
`
bpxq˘´epxq‰. This assumption strikes us as inconsistent. If one evaluates
bpxq through the utility function of the person choosing x, one should consistently evaluate
epxq through the utility function of the person suﬀering the external cost. Moreover, risk
preferences in society are heterogenous. A regulator will hardly be able to specify an aggre-
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Figure 3.1 Over- and undercompliance for diﬀerent preference structures
xL “ xS
x˚
σ
Risk Neutral
Risk Averse (ρ “ 0.48)
Reference Dependence (η “ 1, λ “ 2.61)
Consider a rational, fundamentally self-interested person that is averse to
risk. She has a twice diﬀerentiable utility function up¨q with u1p¨q ą 0, u2p¨q ă 0
(concavity). As her utility over absolute income depends on her choice of x,
she derives utility from
uRA
`
x
˘ “
#
u
`
bpxq˘ for x ď xL (compliance)
u
`
bpxq ´ epxq˘ for x ą xL (violation) . (3.5)
Diﬀerentiating her expected utility with respect to x and evaluating this result
at the social optimum xS where b1pxq “ e1pxq yields
gate risk preference that suﬃciently takes into account all idiosyncrasies of members of said
society. Instead, we adopt the idea of a rationality default (Schwartz, 2015): when the facts
are unobtainable or ambiguous, regulators should refrain from behavioural assumptions.
This approach is “autonomy preserving, administrable, and coherent” (Schwartz, 2015, p.
1). The coherent application of the risk-neutral standard xS is also experimentally moti-
vated: in the experiment we only deﬁne one activity benchmark for all participants instead of
a speciﬁc activity benchmark for each participant given her ex ante elicited utility function.
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BURA
`
x
˘
Bx
∣
∣
∣
xS
“ `1 ´ ΦpxSq˘ u1`bpxSq˘ b1pxSq
´ φpxSq
“
u
`
bpxSq
˘ ´ u`bpxSq ´ epxSq˘‰.
(3.6)
Expression (3.6) is similar to the risk-neutral case in expression (3.4). The
ﬁrst term describes the gains for a risk-averse person of marginally increasing
x if found compliant (x ď xL). The second term represents the oﬀsetting eﬀect
that marginal increases in x also increase the probability of being held liable
(x ą xL). This marginal increase is weighted by the opportunity cost of being
found violating the legal standard. Similar to expression (3.4), a person has
an incentive to choose x˚ ă xS when expression (3.6) is negative Conversely,
she has an incentive to choose x˚ ą xS when expression (3.6) is positive.
Analogous to the risk-neutral case, we obtain a risk-averse person’s opti-
mal choice xR˚A by simulating the response function xR˚Apσq. The solid line in
Figure 3.1 depicts this response function. xR˚Apσq shows a pattern very sim-
ilar to xR˚Npσq: standard vagueness initially induces overcompliance but, as
vagueness increases just enough, overcompliance will turn into undercompli-
ance. Moreover, Figure 3.1 reveals that xR˚Apσq ă xR˚Npσq over the entire range
of σ. This result suggests that the domain of overcompliance is larger and that
overcompliance is more severe compared to the risk-neutral case. By contrast,
the domain of undercompliance is smaller and undercompliance is less severe.
Craswell and Calfee (1986, p. 301) also ﬁnd that risk aversion increases the
likelihood of overcompliance. Compared to their result, however, the eﬀect of
risk aversion in the present model is much less pronounced. This diﬀerence is
driven by an implicit assumption of Craswell and Calfee (1986, p. 301). In
addition to risk aversion, they assume asset isolation. Under this assumption
a person separates diﬀerent payoﬀ streams and computes utility for each of the
payoﬀs separately. By contrast, the present model assumes asset integration:
a person ﬁrst computes ﬁnal wealth and then evaluates ﬁnal wealth through
her utility function. 3.7.2 elaborates on this diﬀerence.
3.2.3 Reference-dependent preferences
Our second modiﬁcation changes the assumption on how individuals evalu-
ate outcomes. We incorporate into the model another empirically established
ﬁnding about human behaviour: hedonic consequences of outcomes depend not
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only on absolute outcomes, but also on how these outcomes change relative to
a reference point (cf.: Barberis, 2013). Reference-dependent preferences suc-
cessfully explain observed behaviour that is seemingly at odds with standard
economic predictions. For instance, reference-dependent preferences are useful
to understand why taxi drivers stop working when their earnings are unex-
pectedly high (Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, and Thaler, 1997; Crawford
and Meng, 2011), why sellers overprice their property when facing nominal
losses in a real-estate crisis (Genesove and Mayer, 2001), and why contestants
increase eﬀort in contests with a higher proportion of winners than losers than
in contests designed to yield less winners than losers (Lim, 2010). In the le-
gal context, reference-dependent preferences, e.g., help explain why defendants
are more reluctant than plaintiﬀs to accept settlement oﬀers (Rachlinsky, 1996)
and why plaintiﬀ’s prefer contingent contracts, whereas defendants prefer to
pay their attorneys ﬁxed hourly fees (Zamir and Ritov, 2010).
Speciﬁcally, we build upon Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007)’s modelling
framework. Let overall utility over some good y consist of an absolute, purely
outcome-based utility component m
`
y
˘
and a relative, reference-dependent
gain-loss utility component μ
`
y ´ r˘. While the former term describes the
intrinsic utility a person obtains from y, the latter term describes how a person
feels about changes in utility obtained from y relative to r. Formally, overall
utility is
u
`
y
∣
∣ r
˘ ” m`y˘ ` η μ`y ´ r˘.
Parameter η ě 0 weighs the importance of gain-loss utility relative to outcome-
based utility. Without loss of generality, we assume η “ 1 for the remain-
der of the chapter. We further assume that a person’s absolute utility mp¨q
is unbounded, strictly increasing, and (weakly) concave, i.e., m1p¨q ě 0 and
m2p¨q ď 0.
Gain-loss utility μp¨q satisﬁes the implicit or explicit assumptions about the
value function in prospect theory (see: Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992; Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006). The gain-loss utility function
μpy ´ rq is
μpy ´ rq ”
#
mpy ´ rq for y ě r
´λm`´py ´ rq˘ for y ă r . (3.7)
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Parameter λ ě 1 describes how much the agent weighs losses relative to gains.
When λ ą 1, μp¨q is steeper for losses than for gains, i.e., the person is loss
averse. Moreover, mp¨q ” p¨qα, where parameter α measures diminishing sensi-
tivity of the gain-loss utility function. We assume 0 ă α ă 1 such that μp¨q is
concave in the gain domain and convex in the loss domain. This assumption
is also consistent with the assumptions about the absolute utility component
mp¨q.
To specify the context at hand, let a person derive utility from monetary
income, i.e., y “ wpxq. Similar to expression (3.2), a person’s monetary income
wpxq results from a gamble (bpxq, 1 ´ Φpxq; bpxq ´ epxq, Φpxq). That is, ﬁnal
wealth is stochastic.
The deﬁnition of the reference point r is crucial to predict behaviour. Start-
ing with Kahneman and Tversky (1979), most models of reference-dependent
preferences equate the reference point with the status quo. In this sense, ref-
erence points are mostly deterministic and ﬁxed exogenously. Consistently
following Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), we assume a non-deterministic ref-
erence point that is formed by a person’s lagged expectations about relevant
outcomes of her choice. Intuitively, when a person codes recent beliefs about
outcomes as a reference point, she evaluates any realized outcome by com-
paring it to all possible outcomes. Each comparison is weighted by the ex
ante probability that the alternative outcome occurs. Moreover, let individ-
uals form fully rational expectations: a person correctly predicts her choice
set, how her choice inﬂuences the distribution of possible outcomes, and her
hedonic response.
From her choice of x a person with expectation-based reference-dependent
preferences derives utility
uKR
`
x
˘ “
#
m
`
bpxq˘ ` Φpxq m`epxq˘ for x ď xL (compliance)
m
`
bpxq ´ epxq˘ ´ `1 ´ Φpxq˘ λ m`epxq˘ for x ą xL (violation) .
(3.8)
Intuitively, if a court ﬁnds a person compliant (x ď xL), the person experiences
absolute utility m
`
bpxq˘ from the private beneﬁts of her choice x. Moreover,
she experiences an additional utility Φpxq m`epxq˘ from the comparison of
the actual outcome compared to the counterfactual violation of xL (gain).
Conversely, if a court holds a person liable (x ą xL), she generates utility from
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her private beneﬁts less the compensation payment m
`
bpxq ´ epxq˘. Further,
she experiences an additional disutility
`
1 ´ Φpxq˘ λ m`epxq˘ relative to the
expectation of being found compliant with xL (loss).
Diﬀerentiating her expected utility with respect to x and evaluating the
result at the socially optimal level xS, where b1pxq “ e1pxq, yields
BUKR
`
x
˘
Bx
∣
∣
∣
xS
“ `1 ´ ΦpxSq˘ m1`bpxSq˘ b1pxSq
´ φpxSq
”
m
`
bpxSq
˘ ´ m`bpxSq ´ epxSq˘ı
` φpxSqpλ ´ 1q ΦpxSq m
`
epxSq
˘
´ `1 ´ ΦpxSq˘ pλ ´ 1q ”φpxSq m`epxSq˘ ` ΦpxSq m1`epxSq˘ e1pxSqı.
(3.9)
The ﬁrst and second term describe absolute eﬀects from marginally increasing
x similar to expression (3.6). For x ď xL the decision-maker obtains a marginal
beneﬁt that is discounted by the probability 1 ´ ΦpxSq but he also bears the
opportunity costs for x ą xL as ΦpxSq marginally increases. Due to refer-
ence dependence, we ﬁnd two additional eﬀects. As the third term describes,
marginally increasing the likelihood of x ą xL (violation) also increases the
potential gain experience if this outcome is not realized. The fourth term cap-
tures that marginally increasing x, however, also threatens an increased loss
when violating xL. This countervailing eﬀect is discounted by 1´Φpxq. Again,
a person has an incentive to choose x˚ ă xS when expression (3.9) is negative.
Conversely, she has an incentive to choose x˚ ą xS when expression (3.9) is
positive.
We obtain the optimal choice xK˚R by simulating the response function
xK˚Rpσq analogous to the risk-neutral and the risk-averse case. The dot-dashed
line in Figure 3.1 depicts the ensuing relationship. Under expectation-based
reference-dependent preferences, an increase in standard vagueness σ leads to
a rapid drop of the individually optimal choice (overcompliance). However,
xK˚Rpσq exhibits a much less pronounced tipping point. After the initial drop,
the extent of overcompliant behaviour does not decrease substantially with in-
creasing standard vagueness. We infer from expressions (3.9) and (3.6) that the
diﬀerence between xK˚Rpσq and xR˚Apσq depends on the loss aversion parameter
λ because both expressions are equal when λ “ 1. Depending on the speciﬁc
deﬁnition, the elicitation method, and the estimation approach, estimates of
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the loss aversion coeﬃcient take on values from 1.43 to 4.8 (cf.: Abdellaoui, Ble-
ichrodt, and Paraschiv, 2007; Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and L’Haridon, 2008).
Despite this volatility, the canonical value as reported by Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992) is λ “ 2.25 and researchers commonly embrace λ « 2 as a rule
of thumb (e.g.: Hossain and List, 2012). For all these speciﬁcations of λ our
simulations indicate that xK˚Rpσq ă xS over the entire range of σ. That is,
any amount of standard vagueness induces overcompliance. Importantly, this
analytical result resonates with the argument from legal scholarship that le-
gal uncertainty undermines socially beneﬁcial activities and inhibits economic
development.
3.2.4 Summary & hypotheses
The theoretical conﬂict between doctrinal legal scholarship (e.g.: D’Amato,
1983; Maxeiner, 2007; Smits, 2012) and economic theory of law (e.g.: Calfee
and Craswell, 1984; Craswell and Calfee, 1986; Lang, 2014) about the eﬀects
of legal uncertainty is by no means trivial academic ﬁnger wrestling. We
modelled legal uncertainty as vague standard in a simple negligence model.
The formal analysis supports both views depending on the set of assumptions
about how persons decide. Given a person’s preference structure, the model
thus generates equivocal predictions about the behavioural consequences of
vague standards. The equivocal predictions call for experimental testing.
We formulate our research hypotheses in line with the ﬁndings in law and
economics. Calfee and Craswell (1984) and Craswell and Calfee (1986) pro-
pose that, as standard vagueness σ increases, a person’s activity choice ﬁrst
decreases and then increases again. We obtain the same result from our ex-
pected utility model for risk neutral and risk averse agents (see Figure 3.1).
Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: As standard vagueness σ increases, activity choices ﬁrst
decrease and then increase again. That is, the relation between standard
vagueness and activity choice designates a U-shape.
Moreover, the U-shape between standard vagueness and activity choice im-
plies that overcompliant behaviour is more likely to be observed under lower
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degrees of standard vagueness than under higher degrees of standard vague-
ness. Overcompliant behaviour will thus more easily emerge at low levels of
standard vagueness as opposed to high levels of standard vagueness. We thus
we also include a a hypothesis on the location of behavior, as compared to the
relative position at diﬀerent levels of standard vagueness:
Hypothesis 2: Overcompliant behaviour will emerge at low levels of stan-
dard vagueness and not at high levels of standard vagueness.
3.3 Experimental design
3.3.1 Task & treatments
To emulate the theoretical problem in the laboratory, the main task of the
experiment consisted of two stages. Figure 3.2 illustrates the main task. In the
ﬁrst stage, participants chose an “activity level” between 0 and 1000 units on
a continuous slider (slider choice x). We randomized the initial slider position
because a ﬁxed initial position potentially anchors, and thereby systematically
distorts, participants’ slider choice.
In the second stage, a random draw determined a choice threshold xL. This
random draw was deﬁned by a normal distribution. Across all treatments, the
mean of the normal distribution was set to 500.8 To represent diﬀerent degrees
of standard vagueness, treatments only diﬀered in the standard deviation σ of
the normal distribution. Altogether, the experiment comprised i “ 1, ..., 6
treatments with σi P t1, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500u. Accordingly, the names of
the treatments are SD001, SD100, SD200, SD300, SD400, and SD500. The
experiment employed a between-subjects design: participants were randomly
assigned to only one treatment.
After the draw of the choice threshold, the program compared a partic-
ipant’s slider choice with the choice threshold to determine her payoﬀ. If a
participant chose a slider position less than or equal to the choice threshold
8 Given our parametrization, a slider position of 500 corresponds to the social optimum
xS in the theoretical model. Therefore, setting the mean of the normal distribution to 500
reﬂects the idea that a regulator sets an eﬃcient legal standard.
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Figure 3.2 Game representation of the main task
0 1000
Stage 1:
Slider choice x
x ď xL x ą xL
Stage 2:
Determination of choice threshold xL
bpxq bpxq ´ epxq Outcomes
(compliance: x ď xL), she would gain the payoﬀ bpxq in experimental cur-
rency units (ECU). If her slider choice was greater than the choice threshold
(violation: x ą xL), however, she only received the reduced payoﬀ bpxq ´ epxq
in ECU. The parametrization of the task corresponds to Craswell and Calfee
(1986)’s speciﬁcations used in their Table 1.9 Speciﬁcally, participants’ payoﬀs
given the slider choice were
Πpxq “
#
bpxq “ 50 lnpxq for x ď xL (compliance)
bpxq ´ epxq “ 50 lnpxq ´ 0.1x for x ą xL (violation) .
Participants’ slider choices were incentivized and translated from ECU to EUR
with a conversion rate of 0.03. Altogether, the main task consisted of six
repetitions of these two stages to capture potential learning eﬀects.
A graphical interface providing information for the slider choice accompa-
nied the choice task. First, over the entire range of the slider, participants
9 The same mathematical speciﬁcations determine the response functions in Figure 3.1.
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received a graphical representation of the probability that their slider choice
would exceed the choice threshold. This representation corresponded to the cu-
mulative density function underlying the random draw of the choice threshold.
Second, the interface showed a graphical representation of the slider-choice-
dependent payoﬀ, both for the event that a participant’s slider choice was
smaller than or equal to the choice threshold and for the event that the slider
choice exceeded the choice threshold. Third, the interface also provided infor-
mation about the potential consequences of the current slider position to fur-
ther increase salience of the payoﬀs, the probabilities of each event occurring,
and their dependence on the slider position. We conveniently clariﬁed the pay-
oﬀs and probabilities for each event right next to the corresponding graphical
payoﬀ representation. Thus, for any slider position, participants could see the
speciﬁc payoﬀs and the associated probabilities. As people frequently strug-
gle with numerical probability descriptions (cf.: Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, and
Ghazal, 2012; Peters, 2012), the interface also depicted the speciﬁc probabili-
ties in a pie chart varying with the slider position. We kept the choice interface
predominantly graphical. The experiment aimed at creating the least abstract
choice environment while preserving as much control as possible. Figure 3.7
in 3.7.4 depicts a sample decision screen from the experiment.
After the main task, we conducted two incentivized post-tests relevant to
the theoretical predictions. The ﬁrst post-test elicited risk preferences follow-
ing a multiple price list (MPL) approach (Holt and Laury, 2002; Gneezy, Imas,
and List, 2015). The second post-test elicited participants’ preferences over
gains and losses (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and L’Haridon, 2008).
3.3.2 Procedure & sample
The experiment was conducted in January 2015 in the experimental laboratory
of Friedrich Schiller University Jena. Altogether, 137 student subjects partic-
ipated in the experiment.10 Table 3.1 contains further information about the
sample. Upon arrival at the lab, participants were randomly allocated to their
cubicle and their treatment group by drawing a number from an urn. The
experiment comprised eight sessions with three treatment groups each, i.e.,
SD001, SD100, SD200 in sessions 1-4 and SD300, SD400, SD500 sessions 5-8.
10 We programmed the experiment with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and we recruited
participant with ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
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Table 3.1: Sample statistics per treatment and overall
SD001 SD100 SD200 SD300 SD400 SD500 overall
# participants 24 24 21 24 24 20 137
% participants 17.52 17.52 15.33 17.52 17.52 14.60 100.00
% female 58.33 50.00 66.67 58.33 45.83 50.00 54.74
# Age (avg.) 25.44 26.24 25.24 25.78 25.18 26.67 25.74
ﬁeld of study: law 0 3 5 0 1 3 12
ﬁeld of study: economics 4 4 4 5 3 4 24
ﬁeld of study: natural science 3 6 3 6 5 5 28
ﬁeld of study: other 17 11 9 13 15 8 73
Because the choice in the main task was complex and participants con-
fronted probability distributions, they received video instructions instead of
mere textual instructions. The 11 minute video provided detailed informa-
tion about the functionality of and the information displayed on the graphical
interface, about the payoﬀ structure, about the choice threshold, and about
the probability distributions underlying its determination.11 The instructions
and the choice interface contained neutral language to avoid contextual asso-
ciations and label eﬀects. To ensure that participants understood the video
instructions, they had to correctly answer a set of control questions. Without a
correct answer, they could not advance to the main task. After the main task,
participants completed the two post-tests. All sessions lasted approximately
45 minutes.
At the end of each session, one of the eight rounds—six rounds in the main
task and two post tests—was randomly selected for payment. Altogether,
participants received a payment between 6.30 EUR and 15.10 EUR including
a show-up fee. Participants earned 8.70 EUR on average.
3.4 Analysis & Results
Hypothesis 1 holds that the relation between standard vagueness and activ-
ity choice designates a U-shape. In terms of our experiment, we predict that
11 Video instructions for a sample treatment can be viewed through this link:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ebox9bgwr3kd4an/AABsUKtL44Ng4QI4aqtX19-la?dl=0 .
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slider choices of participants will ﬁrst decrease and then increase as treat-
ments progress from SD001 to SD500. Figure 3.3 depicts the slider choices of
each participant conditional on treatment and the smoothed conditional mean
across treatments. In line with Hypothesis 1 the smoothed conditional mean
in Figure 3.3 suggests a U-shaped relationship between increasing variability
of the choice threshold and participants’ average slider choice.
Figure 3.3 Individual slider choices by treatment
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To conﬁrm the observation from Figure 3.3 we regress our treatment vari-
able as a linear term and as a quadratic term on the participants’ slider choice.
As we have multiple responses per subject and thus need to resolve non-
independence, we estimate the following mixed eﬀects model with random
intercepts:
sliderij “ β0j ` β1 pSD2ij{100q ` β2 SDij ` 
ij.
To properly center the estimation of the parabola, we deducted the mean
(250) from our treatment variable, this has the added beneﬁt of reducing the
correlation between the linear and the squared term. Moreover, maximum-
likelihood estimators can have problems when some predictor variables are
much larger than others. As a precaution, we thus rescaled the quadratic
treatment variable by dividing it by a constant.
Table 3.2 reports the results from the estimation. The positive and sig-
niﬁcant coeﬃcient of the quadratic term (Likelihood Ratio test: χ2 “ 2.839,
p “ 0.092) conﬁrms the convexity observed in Figure 3.3. The coeﬃcient of the
linear term is slightly positive but close to zero and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of SD
(Likelihood Ratio test: χ2 “ 8.979, p “ 0.003). This indicates the presence
of a U-shape with a slight positive linear trend. We also conclude that the
participants’ slider choices at the highest level of variability are larger than at
the lowest level of variability.
Table 3.2: Convexity of slider choice
(Intercept) SD2{100 SD
coeﬃcient 460.517˚˚˚ 0.067˚ 0.181˚˚˚
(st.error) p14.899q p0.040q p0.060q
˚: p ă 0.10; ˚˚: p ă 0.05; ˚˚˚: p ă 0.01.
Result 1 (U-shape): With increasing variability of the choice threshold,
participants’ slider choices conform to a U-shape.
The results in Table 3.2 also inform the analysis of Hypotheses 2. Hy-
pothesis 2 holds that overcompliant behaviour will emerge at low levels of
standard vagueness. Given the parametrization in the experiment, the choice
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threshold under certainty is 500. This would also be the socially optimal
amount derived as a benchmark from the theoretical model. Consequently,
overcompliant choices are slider choices less than 500. In Table 3.2, the lower-
than-500 intercept suggests that, on average, slider choices are lower than 500
(overcompliance) at the lowest level of standard vagueness, with the regressor
coeﬃcients suggesting that the activity level gradually increases.
To commence testing Hypothesis 2, we use a series of one-sample Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests conditional on treatment. Table 3.3 reports the results. We
reject the null hypothesis that the true location of the average slider choices
is larger than or equal to 500 only for treatments SD001, SD100, and SD200.
By contrast, average slider choices in SD300, SD400, and SD500 are not sig-
niﬁcantly below the 500-mark. Figure 3.3 illustrates that this result is not
a mere artefact of a lack of observations in the overcompliance domain. As
in SD300, SD400, and SD500 participants on average chose a slider position
that was not signiﬁcantly below the 500-mark, we conclude overcompliant be-
haviour emerged at lower levels but not at higher levels of variability of the
choice threshold.
Table 3.3: Overcompliance conditional on treatment
Treatment Average Test statistic P-value
choice (V )
SD001 492.56 59 0.004
SD100 393.86 5 ă 0.000
SD200 461.89 34 0.003
SD300 487.76 124.5 0.239
SD400 504.17 150 0.506
SD500 540.32 139 0.899
Note: Results from one-sided, one-sample Wilcoxon
Note: signed-rank tests for overcompliance.
To extend the analysis of Hypothesis 2, we estimate treatment eﬀects on
slider choice with a linear model. SD100 to SD500 enter the estimation as treat-
ment dummies while SD001 is the reference treatment. As before, we resolve
non-independence between within-subject observations by adding a random
eﬀect on the subject level. Model 1 in Table 3.4 reports the results. The sim-
ple model with treatment dummies and random intercepts at the participant
level (model 1) shows that SD100 has a signiﬁcant and substantial negative
eﬀect on the slider choice (Likelihood Ratio test: χ2 “ 5.462, p “ 0.019)
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relative to SD001. Participants’ slider choice in treatments with higher vari-
ability was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from participants’ slider choice in SD001.
Relative to quasi-certainty in SD001, this result suggests overcompliance in
SD100 but not in the other treatments. In a second estimation, we addition-
ally control for risk preference, gain-loss preference, age, and gender (Table
3.4, Model 2).12 While an increase of participants’ risk attitude measure has a
strong and signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on their slider choices (Likelihood Ratio
test: χ2 “ 9.806, p “ 0.002), the negative eﬀect of SD100 relative to SD001
remains signiﬁcant (Likelihood Ratio test: χ2 “ 4.093, p “ 0.043). Neither
the other control variables nor the treatments with higher variability have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on participants’ slider choice. Thus after controlling for risk
preference, gain-loss preference, age, and gender, the regression result is still
consistent with Hypothesis 2: although standard vagueness steadily increases
from SD001 to SD500, compared to SD001 only the low level of variability of
the choice threshold in SD100 has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on participants’
slider choice.
Result 2 (overcompliance early): After controlling for risk attitude, loss
aversion, and gender, only SD100 has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on slider
choices relative to SD001. The result signiﬁes overcompliant choices in
SD100.
As an additional analysis, we assign observed slider choices to one of two
categories. First, we deﬁne slider choices below or equal to the social optimality
benchmark of 500 as “compliant” and the rest as “non-compliant”. With this
categorization we have socially optimal compliance in mind: according to our
model, the regulator attempts to set a precise and eﬃcient standard, which is
always at an activity level of 500. We therefore do not deﬁne these categories in
relation to the choice threshold drawn in each round and for each single choice
because its distribution varied across treatments and, therefore, the meaning
of “compliant” would strongly diﬀer between treatments. We present results
12 Note that we could only introduce the controls (model 2 in Table 3.4) for a subset of
the data. In sessions 1 and 4 of the experiment, right after the main task, we experienced
technical problems with the computer infrastructure of the laboratory. Therefore, we could
not elicit risk preferences and gain-loss preferences of the 35 participants in these sessions.
We ran both estimations on the same subset of the data to increase comparability between
the models.
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in this manner to illustrate the regulator’s success at achieving compliance
with the eﬃcient standard, an evaluation of the results from the regulator’s
perspective.
The left panel of Figure 3.4 illustrates the share of compliant and non-
compliant choices across treatments. In SD001 the vast majority of choices
were compliant (95.24%) and only a small fraction of activity level choices
were non-compliant (4.76%). With the exception of SD300 and SD400, Figure
3.4 shows a steady decrease of the proportion of compliant choices. Simultane-
ously, the proportion of non-compliant choices increases from SD001 to SD300
and from SD400 to SD500. In SD500, only 51.67% of participants’ slider
choices were compliant and 48.33% of choices were non-compliant. As the
shares of compliant and non-compliant choices appear to level out at SD300,
we conduct a Fisher’s exact test and we reject the null that the proportions of
compliant choices are equal between SD001 and SD300 (odds ratio “ 0.0667,
p ă 0.001). At the same time, we do not reject the null that the proportions
of compliant choices are equal between SD300 and SD500 (Fisher’s exact test:
odds ratio “ 0.809, p “ 0.457).
Figure 3.4 Proportions of compliant and socially satisfactory choices
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To analyze these ﬁndings in more detail, we estimate treatment eﬀects
on compliant choices with a probit model. As before, we include SD100 to
SD500 as dummy variables relative to SD001. Risk attitude, loss aversion, age
and gender serve as control variables and we cluster standard errors on the
participant level. From the control variables, only our risk attitude measure
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has a signiﬁcant and slightly positive eﬀect on the probability of a compliant
choice. All treatment variables have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect. As probit
coeﬃcients are diﬃcult to interpret, Table 3.4 reports average marginal eﬀects
(AMEs) calculated from the probit estimation. Average marginal eﬀects range
from ´29.49% in SD100 to ´54.77% in SD500. After conducting an overall
Wald test (χ2 “ 23.277, p ă 0.001), we reject the null that the estimated
coeﬃcients of the probit model are equal across treatments. Speciﬁcally, the
estimated negative eﬀect is signiﬁcantly stronger in SD300 compared to SD200
(Wald test: χ2 “ 9.666, p “ 0.002). In fact, all pairwise comparisons that
include the step from SD200 to SD300 are also signiﬁcant on the 1%-level,
while the estimated coeﬃcients of SD300, SD400, and SD500 are statistically
indistinguishable. Therefore we conclude that SD300, SD400, and SD500 have
signiﬁcantly stronger negative eﬀects than SD100 and SD200 on the probability
that a participant makes a compliant choice.
Result 3 (compliance crowding-out): Relative to SD001 participants in
all treatments are less likely to be compliant. This eﬀect is signiﬁcantly
stronger in SD300, SD400, and SD500 than in SD100 and SD200.
Second, we want to better understand the social impact of standard vague-
ness. To this end, we want to distinguish between those slider positions that
approximate welfare maximisation and those that do not. Given the model
parametrization, a precise and eﬃcient choice threshold would be set at 500.
Under these circumstances, a slider position of 500 would also be the individu-
ally optimal choice. To allow for some noise around the 500 benchmark, we use
the standard deviation from observed slider choices in our quasi-legal-certainty
treatment SD001 (σSD001 “ 49.62). Across all treatments we then deﬁne those
slider choices as “socially satisfactory” that lie within σSD001 around 500. Slider
choices with a larger absolute diﬀerence to 500 are “socially unsatisfactory”.
We use this measure because SD001 resembles the control group of quasi-legal-
certainty and the choices in SD001 are our best empirical benchmark for choice
randomness absent choice threshold variability. Thus standard deviation of the
choices in SD001 resembles the most narrow, yet least arbitrary criterion for
our deﬁnition.
The right panel in Figure 3.4 reveals that the majority of choices in SD001
were socially satisfactory (90.48%), whereas only a small part was not (9.52%).
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By contrast, already in SD100 choices exhibit a drastic reversal: the share of
socially satisfactory choices is much lower (32.74%) than the share of socially
unsatisfactory choices (67.26%). We reject the null that the proportion of so-
cially satisfactory versus socially unsatisfactory choices is equal between SD001
and SD100 (Fisher’s exact test: odds ratio “ 0.052, p ă 0.001). Finally, only
37.50% of slider choices remain socially satisfactory in SD500 whereas 62.50%
were not. We conduct a Fisher’s exact test and reject the null that the pro-
portion of socially satisfactory versus socially unsatisfactory choices are equal
between SD001 and SD500 (odds ratio “ 0.064, p ă 0.001). However, a rejec-
tion is not possible when comparing the proportion of choices between SD100
and SD500 (Fisher’s exact test: odds ratio “ 0.812, p “ 0.452). The evi-
dence indicates that the proportion of socially satisfactory and unsatisfactory
choices switches as soon as the variability of the choice threshold exceeds a
quasi-certain level.
To further analyze this ﬁnding, we estimate eﬀects on socially satisfactory
choice with a probit model, using the same model speciﬁcations as the previous
probit model for compliant choices. Similar to the estimation for compliant
choices, among the control variables only our risk attitude measure has a sig-
niﬁcant and negative eﬀect on the probability of a socially desirable slider
choice. Compared to SD001, all treatments have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect.
Table 3.4 reports average marginal eﬀects (AMEs) calculated from the probit
estimation. Again similar to the previous estimation, all treatment variables
have a signiﬁcant negative average marginal eﬀect, starting at ´36.45% in
SD400 and increasing up to ´43.86% in SD300. In contrast to the analysis of
compliant choices, however, we cannot reject the null that the negative treat-
ment eﬀect is equal across treatments (Wald test: χ2 “ 2.165, p “ 0.705).
This result suggests that introducing variability of the choice threshold has a
strong and signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the probability that a slider choice
is socially satisfactory, irrespective of how pronounced is the variability. We
conclude that, given any degree of standard vagueness beyond quasi-certainty,
persons ﬁnd it diﬃcult to identify a socially satisfactory choice. We interpret
this ﬁnding as loss of the coordination function of the standard. This means
that the tortfeasor and the injured party no longer coordinate on taking pre-
caution through a legal standard, instead either party is now likely to take
precaution (the tortfeasor by reducing his activity level, the injured party by
purchasing insurance), or to rely on the other party to do so. The result is
both ineﬃcient overprecaution/overinsurance and uncovered harm.
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Table 3.4: Summary of regression analysis
Slider choice “compliant” choice “socially satisfactory” choice
Model 1 Model 2 (Probit AMEs) (Probit AMEs)
SD100 ´90.569˚˚ ´77.513˚˚ ´0.295˚˚˚ ´0.404˚˚˚
(39.414) (39.937) (0.104) (0.049)
SD200 ´32.092 ´23.502 ´0.352˚˚˚ ´0.384˚˚˚
(41.337) (41.629) (0.088) (0.051)
SD300 2.215 ´2.220 ´0.516˚˚˚ ´0.439˚˚˚
(34.133) (33.855) (0.057) (0.048)
SD400 18.625 13.175 ´0.493˚˚˚ ´0.365˚˚˚
(34.133) (33.336) (0.063) (0.050)
SD500 54.775 40.497 ´0.548˚˚˚ ´0.416˚˚˚
(35.253) (34.859) (0.068) (0.045)
Risk Attitude ´19.414˚˚˚ 0.051˚˚˚ ´0.056
(6.372) (0.019) (0.021)
Loss Aversion ´0.030 0.001 0.000
(0.302) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.056 ´0.003 ´0.005
(2.571) (0.008) (0.007)
Female 15.906 ´0.088 0.033
(19.383) (0.060) (0.059)
(Intercept) 485.542˚˚˚ 609.659˚˚˚
(27.870) (83.146)
˚: p ă 0.10; ˚˚: p ă 0.05; ˚˚˚: p ă 0.01.
Result 4 (loss of coordination function): All treatments except SD001
(quasi legal certainty) have a strong negative eﬀect on the probability that
a participant chooses a socially satisfactory slider position. This eﬀect does
not diﬀer between these treatments.
3.5 Discussion
The research in this chapter provides laboratory evidence for the eﬀect of stan-
dard vagueness on activity level choices. We use standard vagueness as but
one variation of legal uncertainty. In general, the observations refute the ex-
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plicit and implicit notion in doctrinal legal scholarship that legal uncertainty
should be minimized where possible due to its stiﬂing of socially beneﬁcial
activities (cf.: Trubek, 1972; D’Amato, 1983; Popelier, 2000; Maxeiner, 2007,
2008; Smits, 2012). Although we could capture the legal intuition in a frame-
work of reference-dependent preferences, the results do not match that legal
intuition. However, the results clearly show that our participants were sensi-
tive to the general presence and manipulation of standard vagueness. These
results rather support earlier modelling eﬀorts from the economic theory of
law (Craswell and Calfee, 1986), as well as the notion that increases in legal
uncertainty may necessarily not be socially disadvantageous.
The experimental evidence shows that a meaningful dynamic exists be-
tween activity choices and the degree of standard vagueness. The experiment
does not reveal a monotonic negative relationship between standard vague-
ness and average slider choices, however. Rather, participants in this study
responded non-monotonically to increases in standard vagueness. As a result,
average slider choices exhibit a U-shape (Result 1). Participants were not only
sensitive to the general presence of standard vagueness, but they diﬀerenti-
ated between diﬀerent vagueness levels and adopted non-monotonic responses.
This ﬁnding suggests that intentionally reducing standard vagueness can result
in unintended adverse consequences and undermine activity choices even fur-
ther when standard vagueness is already high. Being concerned about diﬀerent
degrees of legal uncertainty—in contrast to treating a ﬁxed level of legal uncer-
tainty as a working hypothesis—is, therefore, relevant for ﬁnding appropriate
legal solutions. To the detriment of individuals and society, diﬀerent degrees
of legal uncertainty can lead to adverse choices of rule-subjected persons.
Moreover, participants did not consistently choose ineﬃciently low slider
positions. Only initial levels of standard vagueness (SD001, SD100, and SD200)
induced signiﬁcant overcompliant behaviour (Result 2). Whereas one may ex-
pect low standard vagueness to only cause insigniﬁcant overcompliance, over-
compliance was much more pronounced at low standard variability than at
high standard variability. Activity choices dropped quickly when the random
choice threshold became less predictable. Interestingly, however, statistically
meaningful overcompliant behaviour vanished already by SD300.
Altogether our results correspond to previous contributions suggesting that
increasing legal uncertainty can have beneﬁcial eﬀects (Craswell and Calfee,
1986; Lang, 2014). Thus, the experimental evidence from our study suggests
that the doctrinal view is warranted only when a rule designer confronts a
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choice between very low levels of legal uncertainty where activity choices on
average erode with increasing legal uncertainty. Adopting a lower degree of
legal uncertainty when legal uncertainty is already substantial may increase
overcompliance. Conversely, increasing standard vagueness may lead to a so-
cially desirable change in terms of average activity choices. If reducing le-
gal uncertainty is costly, these counter-intuitive implications attain even more
weight.
In addition, the experimental evidence reveals eﬀects that have previously
received little attention. First, the analysis shows that increasing legal un-
certainty gradually decreases the proportions of compliant choices (Result 3).
Under legal uncertainty, compliance is crowded-out. Second, the main share
of participants’ choices is not socially satisfactory as soon as more than mini-
mal levels of legal uncertainty are induced in the experiment (Result 4). This
result suggests that another hidden cost of legal uncertainty manifests in in-
creasingly erratic behaviour: the rule loses its coordination function. To the
best of our knowledge the discussion on legal uncertainty has not focused on
this aspect, let alone backed-up such discussion by empirical results. The ero-
sion of the coordination function of the law is an important ﬁnding because it
aﬀects the cost to society in anticipation of a certain individual activity choice.
Such costs include the excessive or insuﬃcient purchase of insurance and other
investments to forego harm. Although the direct results of the experiment re-
fute much of the legal intuition on legal uncertainty, both the crowding-out of
compliant choices and the undermining of socially satisfactory choices reinvig-
orates the motivation to minimize legal uncertainty where possible. While the
data suggest that an incremental reduction of standard vagueness from higher
to lower levels facilitates compliant choices, stimulating socially satisfactory
choices would require reducing standard vagueness to quasi legal certainty.
This, however, is a tall order.
3.6 Conclusion
Legal scholars and economists disagree about the eﬀects of legal uncertainty
on a person’s activity choice. Legal scholars argue that introducing or increas-
ing legal uncertainty erode socially beneﬁcial activities, whereas economists,
counter-intuitively, propose that doing so may have beneﬁcial eﬀects under
speciﬁc circumstances. We show that a model of activity choice under a vague
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legal standard can accommodate both views depending on the assumptions
about a person’s preference structure.
Our laboratory experiment studies how diﬀerent degrees of standard vague-
ness impact activity choice by varying the dispersion of the distribution un-
derlying the vague standard. The data from our experiment show that ini-
tial degrees of standard vagueness reduce average activity choices below the
socially optimal level. After a suﬃcient increase of standard vagueness, how-
ever, participants’ choices become less overcompliant. After a further increase,
overcompliance vanishes. The data further reveal that both the share of non-
compliant choices and the share of socially undesirable choices substantially
increase with increasing degrees of standard vagueness. With increasing vague-
ness the standard loses its coordination function.
To the extent that our results apply to real-world settings, they have im-
portant policy implications. Whereas legal scholars often conceive of legal
uncertainty as impairment of activity choice, our results suggest that, on av-
erage, reducing legal uncertainty may cause more harm than good. On the
contrary, increasing legal uncertainty may sometimes be socially beneﬁcial.
We do not propose to design rules with a speciﬁc optimal degree of vague-
ness, however. We merely emphasize that the immediate urge to reduce, e.g.,
standard vagueness may be misguided, especially when such a policy gener-
ates substantial additional cost and when some amount of legal uncertainty is
inherent in the law. Yet, whereas increasing legal uncertainty may on average
not be socially detrimental, with increasing vagueness the law looses its coordi-
nation function. Therefore, our results draw attention to the need to shift the
discussion about legal uncertainty from its average eﬀects to the predictabil-
ity of individual behaviour under diﬀerent degrees of legal uncertainty and
the consequences thereof. As our laboratory study implemented a vague legal
standard, we refrain from drawing conclusions for forms of legal uncertainty
diﬀerent from standard vagueness.
Forms of legal uncertainty diﬀerent from standard vagueness, however, are
interesting avenues for further research. For example, legal uncertainty may
concern outcomes such as compensatory or punitive damage awards. More-
over, changes in procedural or evidentiary rules may bias the distribution un-
derlying the legal standard. Promising opportunities for future research also
exist within our paradigm. Our contribution provides both a foundation and
a benchmark to study, for example, the interaction of vague standards with
social preferences. Tortious actions can happen in diﬀerent social contexts:
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under vague standards, a car driver facing a potential traﬃc accident with a
stranger may adjust his activity diﬀerently than a physician treating a long-
term patient that she knows well. Another interesting extension of our study
asks to what extent gain-loss framing eﬀects interact with diﬀerent degrees of
standard vagueness. Finally, while we experimentally test legal uncertainty in-
herent in legal rules, some may conclude from our results that legal uncertainty
may be employed as policy tool. There is however reason to assume that indi-
viduals might derive a speciﬁc disutility from uncertainty in the justice system
which we have not captured in the experiment.
3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Robustness check with uniform distribution
As robustness check, we simulate the optimal responses xi˚ pσq, i P tRN, RA, KRu,
when xL is uniformly distributed around the socially optimal level xS. To in-
corporate the notion of standard vagueness, we have deﬁned xL ∼ UpxS ´
1.25 σ, xS ` 1.25 σq. Figure 3.5 depicts the results. The emerging pattern is
comparable to the pattern under a normal distribution. Therefore our predic-
tions don’t change qualitatively under a uniformly distributed standard.
3.7.2 Diﬀerence to Calfee and Craswell, 1986
Craswell and Calfee (1986) propose in their Appendix A that a person maxi-
mizes UCC
`
x
˘ “ u`bpxq˘ ´ F pxq u`epxq˘, where u1p¨q ą 0, u2p¨q ă 0 (Craswell
and Calfee, 1986, p. 300). Reverse-engineering an expected utility expression
with a complete probability space from the latter maximization problem yields
UCC
`
x
˘ “ u`bpxq˘ ´ F pxq u`epxq˘
“ `1 ´ F pxq˘ u`bpxq˘ ` F pxq u`bpxq˘ ´ F pxq u`epxq˘
“ `1 ´ F pxq˘ u`bpxq˘ ` F pxq `u`bpxq˘ ´ u`epxq˘˘.
(3.10)
Hence, the underlying utility function of Craswell and Calfee (1986)’s risk-
averse agent is
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uCC
`
x
˘ “
#
u
`
bpxq˘ for x ď xL (compliance)
u
`
bpxq˘ ´ u`epxq˘ for x ą xL (violation) .
The crucial diﬀerence between the utility functions uRAp¨q in expression
(??) and uCCp¨q lies in how a person evaluates outcomes of choices that are
potentially violating the legal standard (x ą xL). Under uRAp¨q a person
ﬁrst computes ﬁnal wealth and then evaluates this outcome through his utility
function (asset integration), i.e., u
`
bpxq ´ epxq˘ for x ą xL. Conversely, under
uCCp¨q a person separates these diﬀerent payoﬀ streams and in an isolated way
computes the utility for each of the payoﬀs (asset isolation), i.e., u
`
bpxq˘ ´
u
`
epxq˘ for x ą xL. This diﬀerence concerns a crucial assumption about how a
person edits or codes lottery outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Thaler,
1985; Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin, 1999). The hedonic consequences of the
decision then depend on which editing procedure is used (cf.: Wakker, 2010,
p. 235-236).
The assumption of asset isolation implicitly found its way into Craswell
and Calfee (1986)’s analysis and has consequences for choice predictions un-
der vague standards. Diﬀerentiating expression (3.10) with respect to x and
evaluating the result at the socially optimal level xS, where b1pxq “ e1pxq, yields
BUCC
`
x
˘
Bx
∣
∣
∣
xS
“ “1 ´ F pxSq u1
`
epxSq
˘
u1
`
bpxSq
˘‰ u1`bpxSq˘ b1pxSq ´ F 1pxSq u`epxSq˘.
(3.11)
Note that the marginal beneﬁts of increasing x are not only discounted by
the probability 1´F pxSq as in the main text, but rather by 1´F pxSq u1
`
epxSq
˘{u1`bpxSq˘.
Because we evaluate the decision locally at xS, we reformulate the additional
factor u1
`
epxSq
˘{u1`bpxSq˘ to
u1
`
epxSq
˘
u1
`
bpxSq
˘ “ u1
`
epxSq
˘
u1
`
bpxSq
˘ b1pxSq
b1pxSq “
u1
`
epxSq
˘
u1
`
bpxSq
˘ e1pxSq
b1pxSq “ θ.
Parameter θ may be interpreted as marginal rate of substitution between
u
`
epxq˘ and u`bpxq˘, i.e., the local rate at which a person is willing to com-
pensate for the negative externality of activity x in exchange for receiving the
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private beneﬁts of said activity while maintaining the same level of total util-
ity. If θ ą 1, then 1 ´ F pxSq θ ă 1 ´ F pxSq. With risk aversion and asset
isolation as in (3.11), marginal beneﬁts of increasing x are discounted more
than with risk aversion and asset integration in (??). Therefore, iﬀ θ ą 1 the
ﬁrst term of expression (3.11) is smaller than the ﬁrst term in expression (??).
This case creates a stronger tendency to choose x˚ ą xS (undercompliance).
By contrast, iﬀ θ ă 1 then 1 ´ F pxSq θ ą 1 ´ F pxSq, i.e., marginal utility of
increasing x would be discounted less under asset isolation. Therefore, iﬀ θ ă 1
the ﬁrst term of expression (3.11) is larger than the ﬁrst term in expression
(??). This case creates a stronger tendency to choose x˚ ă xs (overcompli-
ance). Altogether, a person who edits outcomes according to asset isolation is
more likely to deviate from xS when the legal standard is somewhat random.
To illustrate the contrast from assuming asset isolation in lieu of asset inte-
gration, we simulate the distinctive response function xC˚Cpσq (asset isolation)
and compare it to xR˚Apσq (asset integration) in Figure 3.6. Instead of a tran-
sition from overcompliance at lower degrees of vagueness to undercompliance
at higher degrees of vagueness, xC˚Cpσq exhibits a rapid drop over the entire
range of σ so that xC˚Cpσq ă xR˚Apσq. This pattern signiﬁes extensive overcom-
pliance. That is, assuming asset isolation combined with risk aversion supports
the legal scholarship view on legal uncertainty.
3.7.3 Parameter speciﬁcation
For the generation of the hypotheses, for the simulation of the diﬀerent re-
sponse functions, and for the payoﬀ structure in the experiment, the following
speciﬁcations for bpxq and epxq hold:
bpxq “ 50 lnpxq
epxq “ 0.1 x
These speciﬁcations come from Craswell and Calfee (1986)’s ﬁrst example
(Craswell and Calfee, 1986, p. 284).
We use a utility function with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA);
speciﬁcally, a utility function from the power family upwq “ wr. Utility func-
tions of this form are widely used for modelling risk aversion in economics
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Figure 3.5 Over- and undercompliance with uniformly distributed xL
xL “ xS
x˚
σ
xR˚N pσq
xR˚Apσq
xK˚Rpσq
Figure 3.6 Asset Integration vs. Asset Integration
xL = xS
x∗
σ
x∗CC(σ)
x∗RA(σ)
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and psychology and often ﬁt empirical results better than alternative func-
tional forms (Wakker, 2008). We parametrized the curvature parameter with
r “ 0.48 in accordance with the recent estimate of Gneezy, Imas, and List
(2015). We prefer the estimate from this elicitation mechanism because risk
attitude is domain speciﬁc and Gneezy, Imas, and List (2015)’s elicitation is
based on lottery choices similar to our experiment.
We parametrize loss aversion with λ “ 2.61 in acoordance with the estima-
tion of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and L’Haridon (2008, p. 258). Their elicitation
method strikes a balance between non-parametric measurements and suscepti-
bility to response error and provides an advantage in measurement eﬃciency.
Moreover, the elicitation mechanism only uses those parametric assumptions
that are widely supported in the literature, i.e., the power speciﬁcation for
utility that we also used to model the curvature of the utility functions. The
method is also perceived to be easier than other methods and minimizes cogni-
tive burden for participants which leads to high reliability. Finally, the method
is robust because elicited measurements do not depend on speciﬁc probability
values. In this regard, the measurements are unconfounded. Abdellaoui, Ble-
ichrodt, and L’Haridon (2008) also found no gender eﬀect in the estimation of
loss aversion with their procedure.
Note that we did not ﬁnd a fundamental change in the prediction pat-
tern from the simulations depicted in Figure 3.1, even when altering the
parametrization.
3.7.4 Additional experimental description
The following ﬁgure contains a decision screen in treatment SD100. The screen
shows the payoﬀ function bpxq for the chosen activity level, the reduced payoﬀ
function bpxq ´ epxq, and a cumulative distribution function that determines
the probability of exceeding the randomly determined activity benchmark.
On this screen, the slider position is set to 762. The screen depicts potential
payoﬀs in ECU with their corresponding probabilities for this slider position.
Because people are commonly found to struggle with the meaning of speciﬁc
probabilities, the pie chart next to the payoﬀs displays the meaning of the
probabilities.
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Figure 3.7 Sample Screen of the Decision Screen in the Experiment
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Chapter 4
Better Safe than Sorry: Can
Social Preferences Mitigate
Defensive Behaviour under Vague
Standards?
Abstract: In Chapter 3 we have investigated behavior when legal standards
are uncertain, based on a theoretical model by Calfee and Craswell (1986).
In this chapter I expand the model and the experimental set-up to allow for
an eﬀect of social preferences. I test the robustness of Chapter 3’s results
to then focus on the eﬀect of legal standard vagueness when social proxim-
ity between a tortfeasor and an injured party is relatively close. I want to
show whether pro-social preferences mitigate defensive behaviour. The data
replicate the presence of overcompliance, without the U-shaped relationship
between activity choices and standard vagueness. Behavior is not adjusted
upon the introduction of a second player whose proﬁt is aﬀected by the activ-
ity. The results cast doubt on the original predictions and on the experimental
results from Chapter 3. Instead defensive behavior seems to occur at any level
of standard vagueness. Pro-social preferences seem to mitigate defensive be-
havior, but loose their predictive power at high levels of standard vagueness.
Keywords: legal vagueness; social preferences; experimental law and economics
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4.1 Introduction
The discomfort with the prevalence of legal indeterminacy and legal uncer-
tainty has been addressed regularly during the past two centuries by scholars
in the ﬁeld of legal philosophy. In 1823, Jeremy Bentham expressed his dislike
for the unpredictability of the common law, which he largely associated with
the fact that law was created ex-post, rather than provided to society ex-ante
(Bentham, 1823, ch. XVII, sec. 83). Bentham considered this feature of un-
codiﬁed law as a major forgone opportunity for the lawmaker: in sanctioning
ex post, the lawmaker cannot use the law to provide a behavioural framework
to steer society as a whole.1 The realisation that codiﬁcation also fails to erad-
icate uncertainty is discussed just as comprehensively by scholars of civil law.
The most passionate illustration is provided by Von Jhering, referring to his
dream of the heaven for legal theoreticians. In this dream he envisioned ﬁnally
seeing the entirety of vague concepts of jurisprudence present themselves to
him in perfect clarity (Von Jhering, 1884).
Codiﬁcation cannot dispose of that share of legal uncertainty that origi-
nates from the use of imprecise legal concepts, such as due, reasonable, con-
tract, conspiracy, malice or proximate cause, which can all be manipulated
in a variety of acceptable ways (Cohen, 1935). Indeterminacy of codiﬁed law
prevails because the complete clariﬁcation of vague concepts would require
their meticulous deﬁnition for each possible situation. The cost of generating
and handling such a comprehensive code would be prohibitive. Furthermore,
greater speciﬁcity of a code is also associated with a high likelihood for internal
inconsistencies (D’Amato, 1983). Given that uncertainty over legal obligations
prevails, irrespective of the underlying legal system, its eﬀect on behaviour and
the extent to which it can be guided should be investigated.
The eﬀect of probabilistic enforcement on compliance with the law was ini-
tially formalised by Becker (1968) in the context of the deterrence of criminal
behaviour. According to his deterrence hypothesis, crime rates decline in in-
creases in the probability of punishment, as the expected cost to some criminals
of punishment outweighs the expected beneﬁt of the criminal activity.2
1 Bentham goes so far as to compare the development of the common law to the way
a dog is taught to behave: "When your dog does anything you want to break him of, you
wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. This is the way you make laws for your dog
and this is the way judges made law for you and me." (Works V 235)
2 The deterrence hypothesis states that criminal behaviour declines both in the proba-
bility of punishment, as well as in the magnitude of the ﬁne.
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Outside of criminal law, legal standard vagueness brings about a similar
trade-oﬀ as probabilistic criminal enforcement (Sunstein, 1995): The prob-
ability of being held liable at a given level of undercompliance decreases in
increases of legal standard vagueness. Hence, increases in standard vagueness
reduce the expected cost of liability at any level of undercompliance, and make
undercompliance relatively more attractive to the agent. As compared to the
criminal scenario, there exists a further dimension in which the agent’s be-
haviour can diverge from the optimum under a vague legal standard, namely
by making overcompliant or defensive choices. Even at high levels of precau-
tion, agents face a positive probability of being held liable, which they can
reduce by increasing their compliance eﬀorts even further. As a result, legal
standard vagueness might actually stiﬂe behaviour that the law-maker seeks
to encourage (D’Amato, 1983).
The contributions of Calfee and Craswell (1984) and Craswell and Calfee
(1986) formalise these two opposing eﬀects of uncertainty over legal standards
on actors’ eﬀorts to comply with the law. In a pure expected-value framework,
Craswell and Calfee (1986) conclude that relatively low levels of uncertainty
cause actors to overcomply with the standard, while relatively high levels of
standard vagueness will induce undercompliance.
In the previous chapter we expanded the model of Craswell and Calfee
(1986) to incorporate various behavioural paradigms, and use a laboratory
experiment to test the predictions. The results conﬁrm the predictions from
the original paper, reject the inﬂuence of prospect theory, point out the im-
portance of individual risk preferences, and suggest that both overcompliance
and undercompliance can be consequences of legal uncertainty. Furthermore,
the ﬁndings suggest that increasing legal standard vagueness might actually
decrease the deviation from the lawmaker’s desired behaviour, and therefore
increase social eﬃciency. There is even evidence that, at least in theory, there
exists a level of standard vagueness that induces compliance and which can
therefore serve as a second-best alternative to legal certainty. This notion of
positive eﬀects from legal uncertainty is also in line with the theoretical ﬁnd-
ings of Lang (2014) and a more general reconsideration of the issue outside of
traditional legal scholarship.
This chapter complements Chapter 3 by allowing for the presence of social
preferences in the actor’s utility function. This is relevant from a theoreti-
cal point of view, as it reverses the original model’s predictions in terms of
over- and undercompliance. With regard to the application of the results,
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social preferences likely play a role in all circumstances in which decision mak-
ing agents are aware of the externality they might produce, and particularly
when they can also identify the party who will bear the cost of the external-
ity. Principal-agent relationships, such as the physician-patient relationship
can serve as practical examples in which defensive behaviour is particularly
frequent and well documented.
The scope of defensive behaviour in the medical sector is illustrated by
Studdert et al. (2005). The authors ﬁnd that 93% of the responding physicians
admit to the practise of defensive medicine, indicating that they deviate from
optimal behaviour to reduce their probability of liability. Thirty-nine percent
of the specialist physicians have decided to restrict treatment in cases with
high risk of liability, a practise that is known as ’negative defensive medicine’.
Fifty-nine percent of the surveyed physicians admitted to being overcautious,
or engaging in so-called ’positive defensive medicine’. This proportion was
signiﬁcantly higher amongst specialist practitioners. A more recent study by
Bishop, Federman, and Keyhani (2010) conﬁrms this ﬁnding. The authors
determine that 91% of physicians in the US believe that malpractice pressure
leads to an increase in the number of ordered diagnostic tests and procedures
beyond the necessary amount. Hence, insight into the eﬀect of vague standards
holds the potential for vast savings from reducing the cost from overcompliance.
In this chapter I focus on three main behavioural theories that would ex-
plain a divergence in results from the ﬁndings in Chapter 3. All three are used
to explain distributional choices in one-shot games.
A ﬁrst theory explains individuals’ choices by their preference for equitable
outcomes, following the formalisation of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Inequity
aversion claims that individuals experience disutility from either receiving a
higher payoﬀ or a lower payoﬀ than their peers. Secondly, I will incorporate
a preference for social eﬃciency into the model. Experimental evidence shows
that subjects in binary-choice dictator games were more willing to make eﬃ-
ciency promoting choices than equity oriented ones, even if this reduced the
individual’s own payoﬀ (Bolle and Kritikos, 2001). Furthermore, Andreoni and
Miller (2002), Charness and Rabin (2002) and Engelmann and Strobel (2004)
show that the giving behaviour of a non-negligible fraction of participants,
in a range of games, can be explained with a preference for socially eﬃcient
outcome. As a third theory I will consider that decision making agents attach
weight to the outcome of the least well-oﬀ individual in a given society. These
Rawlsian or maximin preferences have contributed to the explanation of the
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results of several laboratory experiments (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Charness
and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004).
In the following Section 4.2, I will brieﬂy introduce the initial theoretical
model as in Chapter 3, which is based on the work of Craswell and Calfee
(1986). Subsequently, I will incorporate the behavioural theories mentioned
above, and derive hypotheses for the behaviour of the decision maker. The
experimental set-up will be described in Section 4.3. I will provide the experi-
mental results in Section 4.4, and discuss their implications in Section 4.5. In
Section 4.6, I oﬀer concluding remarks.
4.2 Theory & Predictions
Similarly to the approach in Chapter 3, I derive predictions based on Calfee
and Craswell’s (1986) theoretical model, in which a rational and self-interested
agent chooses a particular activity level x with x P r0, x¯s, wehere x¯ is the upper
boundary of the activity level x. The agent’s proﬁt from engaging in activity
x are described bpxq, which is assumed to be concave, i.e. b1pxq ą 0, b2pxq ď 0.
As in Chapter 3, engaging in activity x generates a negative externality
epxq, which now presents a real cost to another person. I assume that the
externality function epxq is twice diﬀerentiable and convex, i.e., e1pxq ą 0,
e2pxq ě 0.
The socially optimal activity level, xs, maximises the diﬀerence between
the beneﬁt from activity x and the cost from the externality. Hence, optimal-
ity is achieved when the condition b1pxq “ e1pxq is met, when the marginal
beneﬁt from activity x yields the marginal cost. A social planner will seek to
discourage overcompliance, choices where x ą xs and undercompliance, where
x ă xs, by enforcing reimbursement for the externality at high activity levels
and abstaining from doing so at low activity levels.
This requires the introduction of a legal standard Xl, with 0 ă Xl ă x¯,
to regulate activity x. The standard represents the maximum quantity of
activity x that is tolerated in the particular society. As long as an agent
chooses an activity level below or equal to this legal standard, x ď Xl ă x¯,
she is considered compliant and will not face legal consequences. Inversely, an
agent who chooses Xl ă x ď x¯, violates the legal standard and has to perfectly
compensate the other person for the costs of the externality.
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In line with Chapter 3, I assume that the legal standard is not ﬁxed, but
rather that it is normally distributed around the optimal level, xs, i.e., Xl ∼
N pxs, σq.3 When the agent selects her activity level, she only knows that
with increasing x, there is an increasing probability P px ą Xlq “ Φpxq with
φpxq ą 0 that she will be found in violation with Xl and will therefore be held
liable. Conversely, P px ď Xlq “ 1 ´ Φpxq represents the (counter-)probability
that the agent is found compliant with Xl.
The assumption of the stochastic nature of Xl is intended to reﬂect real
world scenarios, such as the diﬀering interpretation of vague legal standards,
the ex-post determination of standards of care or generally imperfect knowl-
edge about the law by those who are subject to it.
The degree of standard vagueness is given by the standard deviation σ of
Φpxq. A larger σ indicates a wider range of possible legal standards, Xl, around
the distribution mean, xs.
4.2.1 Standard preferences
In this section I brieﬂy describe behavior under standard preferences, a detailed
derivation can be found in Section 3.2.1 in the previous chapter.
Figure 4.1 depicts the relationship between standard vagueness and the
chosen activity level.4 The vertical axis of the graph in Figure 4.1 measures
the activity level and depicts the individually optimal choice x˚ relative to the
socially optimal level xs. The horizontal axis in the graph measures the stan-
dard deviation, σ, of the distribution of the legal standard. The solid line in
Figure 4.1 represents the response function xS˚pσq under standard preferences:
if μ “ xs “ Xl, a suﬃciently low level of standard vagueness is associated with
overcompliance until a tipping point is reached. Beyond this tipping point, any
further increases in σ lead to a reduction of overcompliance and, eventually to
undercompliance. As identiﬁed in Chapter 3, the shape of the response func-
tion allows two main conclusions. First, reductions in the standard vagueness
do not always lead to more socially eﬃcient choices. Depending on the initial
3 As a robustness check, we depict predictions in Chapter 3 for the case where Xl is
uniformly distributed in the Appendix A to their paper.
4 The numerical approximations of all relations xi˚ pσq with i P tS, IE, SEu in Figure 4.1
have been constructed with the software environment R. A mathematical solution was not
possible because F pxq has no closed form representation.
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Figure 4.1 Over- and undercompliance for diﬀerent preference structures
xs
= 500
Activity level, x
Degree of standard vagueness, σ
Selﬁsh (β = 0)
Inequity Averse (α = 0.611, β = 0.525)
Social Eﬃciency (α = −0.5, β = 0.5)
level of uncertainty, vagueness reductions can actually increase the deviation
from the optimum (i.e., the diﬀerence between x˚ and xs “ Xl may increase
xs).5 Secondly, it must be pointed out that at least one further level of stan-
dard vagueness exists, aside from legal certainty, at which the selﬁsh agent
chooses the socially optimal activity level xS˚pσq “ xS˚p0q “ xs.
In the previous chapter we have tested this scenario in the lab and have
collected evidence that conﬁrms the predictions for selﬁsh agents with standard
preferences from Calfee and Craswell (1986). While the original paper and the
model extension in Chapter 3 assume the presence of an aﬀected party, neither
approach takes payoﬀ distribution preferences or cumulative payoﬀ preferences
5 A more extensive analysis within the risk neutral & selﬁsh framework can be found in
Craswell and Calfee (1986).
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into account. I therefore develop alternative predictions for the chosen activity
levels, which are based on diﬀerent models of social preferences.
4.2.2 Social Preferences: Inequity Aversion
The distinctive diﬀerence between this chapter and the experimental research
in Chapter 3 is that the chosen activity level creates a negative externality on
another person. In Chapter 3 the probability and magnitude of a repayment
increased in the activity level, but the chosen activity level only aﬀected the
decision makers own expected payoﬀ. In the new design, the cost to another
participant increases in the selected activity level. This forces the decision
making agent to trade oﬀ the size of her own payoﬀ against the size of another
participant’s payoﬀ, allowing for social preferences to enter into the decision
making process. The particular decision situation shares attributes with two
well-researched situations:
On the one hand, this scenario resembles the dictator game (Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986). In the dictator game, one party (the dictator)
determines how to divide a sum of money between herself and another person
(the recipient). The choice of the activity level is analogous in that the decision
maker’s own proﬁts and the ’recipient’s’ damages increase in the activity level.
Hence, the ’dictator’ allocates (positive and negative) payoﬀs to herself and
the recipient.
The scenario also shares a crucial trait with the ultimatum game (Güth,
Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982). In the ultimatum game, one party divides
a sum of money between herself and a recipient, who then decides to accept or
reject the oﬀer of division. If the the oﬀer is rejected, neither party receives any
payoﬀ. Proposers in the ultimatum game and the active party who chooses
an activity level both face a vague behavioural standard. The proposers in
the ultimatum game don’t know whether a given oﬀer will be accepted by
the recipient, and the decision maker in the decision situation from Chapter
3 does not know with certainty whether the chosen activity level meets the
vague standard. Yet, in both cases the decision makers know that they can
inﬂuence the probability of meeting the standard by changing the generosity
of their oﬀer.
Experimental evidence shows that decision makers do not merely maximise
their own payoﬀs in either situation. Instead fairness and eﬃciency concerns
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play a role. For the sake of making more accurate predictions, I will include
these type of preferences into the decision making agent’s utility function.
In the ﬁrst reconsideration of the model I incorporate inequity aversion
according to the description of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Hence, I assume
that the decision making agent is averse to payoﬀ inequality resulting from her
chosen level of activity, x. The decision making agent experiences disutility
when another individual receives payoﬀs above an upper equitable benchmark
(envy) and when that other individual receives payoﬀs below a lower equitable
benchmark (compassion). There are multiple options for the selected equitable
benchmark with which she compares the other’s payoﬀ. In line with Fehr and
Schmidt (1999), I assume that a person will use her own ﬁnal payoﬀ as the
relevant equitable benchmark to which she compares another person’s payoﬀ.6
Therefore, let an inequity averse person derive utility as described by the
following utility function:
UIEpmi,mjq “ mi ´ α max
“
mj ´ mi, 0
‰ ´ β max“mi ´ mj, 0‰
where mi describes the inequity averse agent’s payoﬀ, mj describes the other’s
payoﬀ, max
“
mj ´ mi, 0
‰
reﬂects the disutility from envy that is weighted by
parameter α, and max
“
mi´mj, 0
‰
represents disutility from compassion that is
weighted by parameter β. In line with Fehr and Schmidt (1999) let us assume
α ě β and 0 ď β ă 1 for the case of inequity aversion. The ﬁrst condition
implies that a decision making agent has a larger disutility from receiving
a dollar less than the other person, than from receiving a dollar more. The
second condition implies that the agent experiences disutility from being better
oﬀ than the other person, but not enough to dispose of her own payoﬀ.
If a person is found compliant with Xl, her payoﬀ is mi “ bpxq and the
other’s payoﬀ is mj “ ´epxq. Conversely, if a person is found to violate Xl, her
payoﬀ is mi “ bpxq ´ epxq due to payment of damages and the others payoﬀ is
mj “ ´epxq ` epxq “ 0 due to perfect compensation. Therefore, I can specify
an inequity averse person’s utility who decides on x as follows:
6 Note, that this is just one option. A person may alternatively care about, e.g., deviations
from the status-quo or from the group’s mean payoﬀ.
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UIE
`
bpxq, epxq˘ “
$’’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’’’%
bpxq ´ α max“´epxq ´ bpxq, 0‰
´β max“bpxq ´ `´epxq˘, 0‰ if x ď Xl
(compliance)
bpxq ´ epxq ´ α max“0 ´ `bpxq ´ epxq˘, 0‰
´β max“bpxq ´ epxq ´ 0, 0‰ if x ą Xl
(violation)
(4.1)
“
$’’’&
’’’%
bpxq ´ β “bpxq ` epxq‰ if x ď Xl
bpxq ´ epxq ´ α max“´bpxq ` epxq, 0‰
´β max“bpxq ´ epxq, 0‰ if x ą Xl
(4.2)
Note that if an agent is found compliant with Xl, since bpxq ě 0 and epxq ď
0, there will never be envy, only compassion, as long as some level of activity x
is carried out (i.e. x ‰ 0). Conversely, if an agent is found noncompliant with
Xl, there will only be envy if bpxq ă |epxq| and the subsequent liability payment
leaves the decision making agent worse oﬀ than the restituted counterpart.
Compassion is only experienced if bpxq ą epxq. For clarity, we denote the
envy term as Epxq “ α max“´bpxq ` epxq, 0‰ and the compassion term as
Cpxq “ β max“bpxq ´ epxq, 0‰.
An inequity averse agent who seeks to maximise expected utility therefore
solves:
max
x
E
“
UIE
`
bpxq, epxq˘‰
ðñ`1 ´ Φpxq˘“bpxq ´ β rbpxq ` epxqss ` Φpxq“bpxq ´ epxq ´ Epxq ´ Cpxq‰
(4.3)
Diﬀerentiating E
“
UIE
`
bpxq, epxq˘‰ with respect to x and evaluating this
result at the social optimum xso where b1pxq “ e1pxq, we obtain:
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BUIE
`
bpxq, epxq˘
Bx “
`
1 ´ Φpx˚IEq
˘ p1 ´ 2 βq b1px˚IEq ´ φpx˚IEq`epx˚IEq
´ β rbpx˚IEq ` epx˚IEqs ` Epx˚IEq ` Cpx˚IEq
˘ !“ 0 (4.4)
The dotted line in Figure 4.1 represents a numerical approximation of
xI˚Epσq. I employ parameter values of α « 0.611 and β « 0.525, which are the
median values, found in a set of experiments by Blanco, Engelmann, and Nor-
mann (2011). For the chosen parameters, xI˚Epσq generates prediction which
oppose xS˚pσq: a suﬃciently low level of σ induces undercompliance, while fur-
ther increases of vagueness ﬁrst reduce undercompliance and eventually induce
overcompliance. However, the deviation from the social optimum is always
smaller, as compared to the standard case. It can be noted that the stan-
dard choice pattern under selﬁsh preferences can also be produced within this
model, as long as the decision maker is indiﬀerent to the other person’s payoﬀ
being less than his own, β ď 0.
4.2.3 Preferences for social eﬃciency
If I relax the imposed parameter restrictions with regard to α and β, the envy
parameter α can take negative values. This signiﬁes that the agent derives
positive utility from the surplus payoﬀ that another person has, compared to
the agent. If the compassion parameter β remains positive, the decision making
agent’s preferences are concerned with the overall payoﬀ in society, or eﬃciency.
While inequity aversion is frequently discussed as the behavioural motivation
to explain non-selﬁsh behaviour in a variety of games, multiple experiments
have shown that the model actually lacks explanatory power. Engelmann and
Strobel (2004) test the relative performance of eﬃciency concerns, maximin
preferences and inequality aversion against each other. The data points to
a stronger inﬂuence of social eﬃciency and maximin concerns as compared
to that of inequality aversion. In line with this ﬁnding, Andreoni and Miller
(2002) estimate that about 22.4% of their sample exhibited some degree of
preference for social eﬃciency and Bolle and Kritikos (2001) ﬁnd a majority
of eﬃciency-oriented participants in binary dictator games.
If individuals are perfectly eﬃciency minded, they prefer the maximisation
of net social beneﬁts and are indiﬀerent which party bears the costs of the
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externality. For parameter values of α “ ´0.5 and β “ 0.5, the agent’s
preferences coincide with the the goal of the sophisticated lawmaker in the
scenario at hand and the agent chooses an activity level of xS˚Epσq “ xs “ Xl
which is depicted as the dashed line in Figure 4.1.
However, it is more common that individuals have somewhat weaker con-
cerns for social eﬃciency. Milder eﬃciency concerns in the utility function will
decrease, but not eliminate, the degree of overcompliance or undercompliance.
Indiﬀerence to the liability payment is speciﬁc to the speciﬁed scenario in
which litigation is costless and punitive damages are excluded. Introducing
litigation costs or punitive damages would reduce the chosen activity level,
xS˚Epσq, at every level of legal standard vagueness, but would also alter the
socially eﬃcient activity level and the lawmaker’s preference.
4.2.4 Social Preferences: maximising the minimum pay-
oﬀ
While inequity aversion has a certain explanatory power for the behaviour in
ultimatum games and public goods games, it does not do as well in predicting
allocations in dictator games (Andreoni and Miller, 2002).
As mentioned in the previous section, Andreoni and Miller (2002) ﬁnd that
behaviour diﬀers according to types. Aside from the group that made decisions
with social eﬃciency in mind, a further 47.2% of the sample behaved in a selﬁsh
manner. The remaining 30.4% preferred equal payoﬀs for the participants,
implying maximin preferences.
I derive behavioural predictions, based on Rawls’ maximin principle, by
changing the assumptions over α and β in Equation (4.2). If α “ 0 and
β “ 1, a person derives positive utility from his own payoﬀ but is indiﬀerent to
another person faring better than her. On the other hand, the person receives
a unit-for unit reduction in her utility, from the diﬀerence between her own
payoﬀ and that of another person who receives less.
Changing the envy and compassion parameters in this way simpliﬁes the
utility function to the following:
UMMpmi,mjq “ minrEpmiq, Epmjqs
(4.5)
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Which can be speciﬁed as:
UMM
`
bpxq, epxq˘ “
$’’’’’’&
’’’’’’%
min
“
bpxq,´epxq‰ if x ď Xl
(compliance)
min
“
bpxq ´ epxq, 0‰ if x ą Xl
(violation)
(4.6)
“
$’’’’’’’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’’’’’’’’%
´epxq if x ď Xl
& x ą 0
0 if x ď Xl
& x “ 0
0 if x ą Xl
& bpxq ě epxq
bpxq ´ epxq if x ą Xl
& bpxq ă epxq
(4.7)
Therefore the agent maximises the following function:
max
x
E
“
UMM
`
bpxq, epxq˘‰
ðñp1 ´ Φpxqq minrbpxq , ´epxqs ` Φpxq minrbpxq ´ epxq , 0s
(4.8)
In the case at hand, the person who bears the cost of the externality is
worse-oﬀ. There exist two ways in which the agent can maximise her payoﬀ:
either by choosing not to engage in the activity at all, xM˚Mpσq “ 0, or by
increasing the activity level to the point at which the repayment is certain,
Φpxq “ 1. The maximin-seeking agent will do the latter, as long as the the
beneﬁt from the undertaking the activity at this level, xΦ“1, is still larger than
the cost from the liability payment, bpxΦ“1q ě epxΦ“1q. If this is no longer the
case, the agent will choose not to engage in the activity at all. Activity choices
under these types of preferences are depicted in Figure 4.5 in the Appendix.
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4.3 Experimental design
I conducted a computer-based experiment to measure how compliance eﬀorts
change when the degree of legal standard vagueness is varied and when the
compliance choice imposes a negative externality on a second participant. Par-
ticipants were asked to make 12 compliance choices under each of 6 diﬀerent
degrees of standard vagueness, both in conditions with and without imposing
negative externality on another participant.
I refer to the the ﬁrst six choices as the ’baseline’ choices. In the six base-
line choices the participants reproduce the choice as in Chapter 3. They decide
on an activity level, while payoﬀ as well as the probability and magnitude of
a repayment increase in the activity level. The choices only aﬀect the deci-
sion makers expected payoﬀ and do not generate an externality for another
participant. Potential repayments are made to the experimenter.
I refer to the second set of choices as ’treatment’ choices. In the six treat-
ment choices, the participants choose an activity level which also aﬀects the
payoﬀ of another participant in the laboratory. The magnitude of the par-
ticipant’s own payoﬀ and the size of the negative externality on another par-
ticipant increase with the activity level. Simultaneously, the probability and
magnitude of the repayment also increase in the activity level. Repayment
in this case is made to the player who was exposed to the externality and
fully compensates the loss from the externality. In this choice situation the
decision maker needs to trade oﬀ his own payoﬀ against the payoﬀ of another
participant.
In each of the 12 conditions, participants used a slider to choose an activity
level between 0 and 1000 units. If their chosen activity level was at or below
the subsequently determined maximum level, the participant earned a full
payoﬀ. If the chosen activity level was higher than the maximum level, the
participant had to repay part of the payoﬀ. Depending on the treatment,
either to the experimenter or to the second player who had been aﬀected by
the negative externality from the activity. The degree of vagueness in the legal
standard determined the probability of a repayment at every chosen activity
level. Choosing an activity level therefore resembled a choice between 1001
lotteries with diﬀerent payoﬀs and probabilities.
The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). I con-
ducted 5 sessions with a total of 78 participants in December 2015 at the
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economic laboratory of the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena. Two par-
ticipants had to be excluded, leaving a total of 76 observations.7 The par-
ticipants were students recruited through Orsee (Greiner, 2004). All decisions
were incentivised, with average earnings amounting to about e9, including the
mandatory show-up fee of e2,50. Each session lasted approximately 45 min-
utes. The participants received instructions via video clips which explained
the functionality of the computer interface, illustrated earning opportunities
and which provided an eﬀective visual aid in explaining the construction and
consequence of the vague behavioural standard.8
4.3.1 Task
In the ﬁrst stage of the main game the participants selected their preferred
activity level on a slider ranging from 0 to 1000 units. The higher the chosen
activity level, the higher was the potential payoﬀ in each of the 12 conditions.
The interface provided graphical representations of the potential payoﬀ, the
potential repayment and the likelihood of meeting the behavioural standard.
Payoﬀs were reported in Experimental Currency Units (ECU), where 1 ECU
was equal to e0,04. Speciﬁcally, payoﬀs for the slider choice were:
Πpxq “
#
bpxq “ 50 lnpxq if x ď Xl (compliance)
bpxq ´ epxq “ 50 lnpxq ´ 0.1x if x ą Xl (violation) .
In the second stage of the main game the liability standard Xl was drawn
from a normal distribution, with a mean of 500 and a standard deviation
which reﬂected the relevant degree of legal uncertainty. The six diﬀerent lev-
els of standard vagueness were represented by standard deviations of σi P
t1, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500u.
It was then determined whether the chosen activity level was compliant
with the drawn liability standard Xl. If the activity level was smaller or equal
to the liability standard, the participant received the full payoﬀ bpxq. If the
activity level exceeded the standard, the participant received bpxq less the
repayment epxq. The structure of the main game is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
7 The original data set includes 78 participants. One participant with prior knowledge of
the main game and one participant who failed to answer the comprehension questions were
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Figure 4.2 Game representation of the main task
0 1000
Stage 1:
Choice of activity level x
x ď Xl x ą Xl
Stage 2:
Standard Xl is determined
150ECU ` bpxq 150ECU ` bpxq ´ epxqOutcomes for decision maker:
150ECU ´ epxq 150ECUOutcomes for passive participant:
Only relevant for decisions 7-12.
Each participant took decisions under 6 diﬀerent degrees of standard vague-
ness in the presence and absence of an aﬀected second player, a total of 12
decisions per participant.9 All twelve decisions were made in one stage and
within the same screen. The computer screen featured icons for all 12 deci-
sions and participants could choose the order in which they attended to the
scenarios by clicking on the icons. They could also edit previous decisions.
This set-up was chosen to prevent eﬀects related to the sequence in which the
scenarios were presented, and to allow participants to compare scenarios and
previous decisions. Refer to the Appendix for a sample decision screen from
the experiment (Figure 4.6).
eliminated from the data set, prior to the analysis.
8 https://www.dropbox.com/sh/lyﬀejt05mr110q/AABZu2ktuqfzXCfX6z5XwBKra?dl=0
9 The six speciﬁc choice situations are derived from Calfee and Craswell’s (1986) Table
1, using the same parameterisation as in Chapter 3.
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For the six decision scenarios in which another player was aﬀected, all
participants were separated into ’active’ and ’passive’ participants, but not
initially informed about their role. All participants selected an activity level
which imposed a negative externality on a passive player. Subsequently the de-
cision was implemented in accordance with the assigned role. The participants
received an initial endowment of 150 ECU before the ﬁrst stage to prevent a
negative payoﬀ for passive types.
After the main task, I conducted two post-tests to reveal participants’
social- and risk preferences. I elicited risk preferences following a multiple
price list approach according to Holt and Laury (2002) and elicited social
preferences according to the ring measure as devised by Murphy, Ackermann,
and Handgraaf (2011) and implemented for z-Tree by Crosetto, Weisel, and
Winter (2012).
4.3.2 Experimental hypotheses
Before analysing the eﬀect of social considerations, I establish whether my
baseline data replicates the results from Chapter 3. Therefore, I am interested
in eﬀect of standard vagueness on selected activity levels in the baseline sec-
tion of the experiment. As in Chapter 3, I want to determine whether the
data displays convexity, with decreasing activity levels up to a turning point,
after which activity levels increase as predicted by Calfee and Craswell (1986).
Therefore Hypothesis 1 is concerned with the shape of the relationship:
Hypothesis 1 (Convexity): The choice behaviour in the baseline condition
displays convexity. Chosen activity levels decline at a decreasing rate in
standard vagueness. Beyond a minimal turning point, chosen activity levels
increase in standard vagueness.
After establishing the baseline case, Hypothesis 2 is concerned with the
presence of a treatment eﬀect when the activity imposes an externality on
another participant. Speciﬁcally, I determine whether the chosen activity levels
from the baseline section lie below the activity levels from the treatment section
of the experiment, as predicted in Section 4.2.
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Hypothesis 2 (treatment eﬀect): At all tested levels of standard devia-
tion, activity levels in the baseline condition lie below the chosen activity
levels in the treatment condition.
Hypothesis 3 is concerned with the domain of the divergence between base-
line and treatment section. The vast majority of the models in Section 4.2
predict not only higher average activity levels in the treatment section, com-
pared to the overcompliance in the baseline section, but also that they will lie
above the socially eﬃcient level in the domain of undercompliance.
Hypothesis 3 (undercompliance): At all tested levels of standard devi-
ation in the treatment condition, participants will choose activity levels in
the undercompliance domain.
In Hypothesis 4 I focus on the eﬀect of social value orientation (SVO) on
the shape of the response function. Social value orientation is measured in
an incentivized post-test, recorded as a continuous measure. This allows to
compare participants in terms of their relative preference for individualistic,
prosocial or altruistic decisions. In line with the predictions in Section 4.2, I
hypothesize that these measures aﬀect the overall level of choice behaviour and
aﬀect the shape of the response function, with higher values of the inequality
aversion score/angle leading to ’decreased’ concavity in the response function
in the treatment section of the data.
Hypothesis 4 (social value orientation): Social value orientation aﬀects
activity choice, both in terms of the level of behaviour and in terms of the
shape of the response function. The linear eﬀect is (more) positive, while
the shape is ’more concave’.
In Hypothesis 5 I will shed light on the development of the variability
of decisions. In Chapter 3, we referred to the increasing variability of chosen
activity levels at higher levels of legal standard vagueness as ’erratic behaviour’.
This pattern embodies a considerable social cost of standard vagueness, namely
the loss in coordination, brought about by (relatively) certain legal standards.
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I want to test whether the degree of this costly loss of coordination persists in
the treatment section.
Hypothesis 5 (variability): The variability of chosen activity levels in-
creases with the level of standard vagueness in baseline and treatment
group.
4.4 Analysis & Results
I present the results in two subsections. Initially I provide descriptive statistics
and highlight the diﬀerences and similarities to the results from Chapter 3.
Secondly, I will conduct a detailed evaluation of the experimental hypotheses
set out in Subsection 4.3.2.
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics and relation to the previous
experiment
The sample consists of 76 students from various academic backgrounds. The
average age was about 25 years, and approximately 57% of the sample were
female.
To better grasp the level of comprehension in the main game, all par-
ticipants were asked to report on their knowledge of mathematics and their
perceived understanding of the main task within a questionnaire at the end of
the experiment. Roughly 79% of the participants reported being comfortable
with handling fractions and calculating percentages, which is crucial to com-
pleting the choice task. Despite the presence of participants with relatively
low self-reported math skills, about 96% of the participants stated that they
fully understood the task. I conclude that the participants made their deci-
sions deliberately and in full awareness of the consequences. The results of the
questionnaire are summarised in Table 4.3 in the Appendix.
Figure 4.3 depicts the average activity choices from the main game and
compares the data to the results from Chapter 3. The left panel shows the
mean activity level, for each level of standard vagueness. The green line shows
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the U-shaped response curve, as found in Chapter 3. The equivalent data
from the baseline section of the recent study is depicted by the black line, and
decisions with an externality-aﬀected second party are depicted by the grey
line.
Neither the data from the baseline section, nor the data from the treatment
section seem to replicate the ﬁndings from Chapter 3, but seem to be indicative
of convexity, as per Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, activity levels in the treatment
section do not appear to be signiﬁcantly higher than in the baseline section
(Hypothesis 2) and average activity levels in both data sections lie in the
overcompliance domain (Hypothesis 3).
The right panel of Figure 4.3 displays the standard deviation of the choices
at each activity level, which is used to measure the degree of volatility and
unpredictability in behaviour. The data seems to reinforce Chapter 3’s ﬁnding
that behaviour becomes more erratic as legal standard vagueness increases
(Hypothesis 5).
Figure 4.3 Mean and standard deviation of activity choices at each vagueness
level
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4.4.2 Testing the hypotheses
Hypothesis I: Convexity in the baseline results
In Hypothesis 1 (Convexity), I suppose that average activity levels in the
baseline section of the experiment follow a convex distribution. This supposes
that activity choices initially decrease with standard vagueness, but at a slow-
ing rate. Beyond a minimal turning point activity choices might then even
commence to increase in standard vagueness, resulting in the characteristic U-
shape, detected earlier in Chapter 3. While Figure 4.3 in the previous section
does not display a U-shape for the baseline data, it does show slight convexity.
To test for the presence of convexity, I estimate the chosen activity level in
the baseline section of the data as a function of standard vagueness (SD) and
squared standard vagueness. The coeﬃcient of squared standard vagueness
in Table 4.1 is positive and signiﬁcant, pointing to slight convexity, providing
evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1. While the overall trend is negative, this
might only hold for the given range of vagueness levels. It is not unlikely that
we would observe a positive slope at very high levels of standard vagueness,
completing the U-shape. It is worth noticing that risk preferences have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on choice behaviour. The higher the degree of risk aversion,
the lower the selected activity level.10
Overall, I do ﬁnd evidence in support of Hypothesis 1 and can conclude that
activity choices follow a convex pattern in the baseline part of the experiment.
A more detailed analysis reveals heterogeneity in the individual response
patterns. Figure 4.8 in the Appendix graphically represents this heterogeneity.
I estimate the individual coeﬃcients for standard vagueness and squared stan-
dard vagueness and plot these against each other. The plot reveals convexity
(βSD2 ą 0) for the majority of observations and U-shaped response patterns
(βSD2 ą 0 and βSD « 0) for approximately 29% of the participants. Individual
response patterns are also displayed in Figure 4.7 in the Appendix.
10 For a complete analysis, the equivalent results for the treatment data are printed in
Table in the Appendix. As suggested by Figure 4.3 the ﬁndings do not diﬀer much between
baseline and treatment section. The coeﬃcient of squared standard vagueness is slightly
smaller than in the baseline section, showing less convexity. This small diﬀerence can be
found in Figure 4.3 as well: average activity choice levels are higher in the baseline data
than in the treatment data at vagueness levels of SD300 and SD500, and lower at SD400.
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Table 4.1: Eﬀect of standard vagueness and squared standard vagueness on
the activity choice in the baseline data
Activity choice Activity choice
Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (OLS)
SD ´0.6762*** ´0.5032***
(0.0766) (0.1106)
SD2 0.0009*** 0.0007***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Risk Preferences ´3.4687**
(1.6052)
(Intercept) 500 500
(set within the model) (set within the model)
*: p ă 0.10; **:p ă 0.05; ***:p ă 0.01
Result 1 (Convexity): I ﬁnd convexity in the baseline data, but cannot
replicate the U-shaped reaction to standard vagueness, as found in Chapter
3.
Hypothesis 2: The treatment eﬀect
In Hypothesis 2 (treatment eﬀect), I test for a diﬀerence in the chosen activity
level between baseline section and treatment section. Speciﬁcally, I am inter-
ested whether the participants choose on average lower activity levels in the
baseline section of the data (without a second player), than in the treatment
section of the data (aﬀected second player).
For the overall comparison of activity level choices in the baseline and
treatment section of the experiment, I regress the level of standard vagueness
and squared standard vagueness on the activity level and interact them with a
dummy variable, which takes the value 0 in the baseline section and the value
1 in the treatment section. In line with the model I predict a positive eﬀect
of SD in the treatment section and a negative coeﬃcient for squared vague-
ness, indicative of concavity. While these coeﬃcients hint at the hypothesized
direction of the treatment eﬀect, the diﬀerence is small and not signiﬁcant.
Therefore I cannot conclude that activity levels diﬀer between baseline and
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treatment section and do not ﬁnd evidence in support of Hypothesis 2. The
results are displayed in Table 4.2.
Result 2 (treatment eﬀect): Choices do not diﬀer between baseline and
treatment section. The generation of a negative externality for another
participant does not aﬀect chosen activity levels.
Table 4.2: Eﬀect of standard vagueness and squared standard vagueness on
the activity choice by treatment and social preference
Activity choice (by treatment) Activity choice (SVO)
Model 3 (OLS) Model 4 (OLS)
SD ´0.6762*** ´0.8283***
(0.0796) (0.1559)
SD2 0.0009*** 0.0012***
(0.0002) (0.0004)
treatment ´16.5744
(13.169)
SD:treatment 0.1736
(0.1473)
SD2:treatment ´0.0003
(0.0003)
SVO angle ´0.4224
(0.5975)
SD: SVO angle 0.0137*
(0.0081)
SD2: SVO angle ´0.000024
(0.000017)
(Intercept) 500 500
(set within the model) (set within the model)
*: p ă 0.10; **:p ă 0.05; ***:p ă 0.01
Hypothesis 3: Undercompliance in the treatment section
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are concerned with the eﬀect of vagueness increases and
the introduction of an aﬀected participant on the activity level. They are not
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concerned with the question whether the activity takes place in the domain
of overcompliance, undercompliance or at social eﬃciency. In line with the
predictions from the theory chapter, Hypothesis 3 (undercompliance) states
that activity choices will be undercompliant at all levels of standard devia-
tion in the treatment condition. Graphically, the left panel in Figure 4.3 in
the previous section already illustrates that all activity choices in baseline and
treatment section lie in the domain of overcompliance (below 500). This in-
tuition is conﬁrmed in the results in Table 4.4 in the Appendix. I regress
standard vagueness and squared standard vagueness on the choice variable in
the treatment section, while setting the intercept at the point of strict com-
pliance (500). The results show that increases in standard vagueness reduce
the chosen activity level below strict compliance, actually into the domain of
overcompliance. The choice pattern exhibits convexity.
Hence, I do not ﬁnd evidence in support of Hypothesis 3.
Result 3 (undercompliance): In baseline and treatment group, icreases
in standard vagueness lead to similar levels of overcompliance.
Hypothesis 4: The eﬀect of social preferences on the shape of the
response function
In Hypothesis 4, I look at the eﬀect of the separately measured indicators of so-
cial preference on the shape and location of the response function. I conducted
the slider task by Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf (2011) in order to gain
a standardized measure for social preferences in the sample. The observations
lie between values of -7.565 and 45, indicating a range of preferences from
perfectly individualistic to prosocial/ eﬃcient. The distribution is depicted
in the left panel of Figure 4.4. In order to relate the ﬁndings to the model
in this chapter, I have associated the angle measure from the post test with
categories of β-values, in accordance with the information provided by Mur-
phy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf (2011). Perfectly individualistic preferences
are associated with β “ 0, preferences for social eﬃciency with β “ 0.5 and
maximin preferences correspond to β “ 1.
In all evaluated theoretical models the type of social preference is predicted
to alter the shape of the response curve. Speciﬁcally, it is predicted that in-
dividualistic preferences are associated with convexity and relatively lower ac-
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tivity choices on average. Prosocial preferences are associated with concave
response curves and relatively higher chosen activity levels. Model 4 in Ta-
ble 4.2 displays the results from regressing the standard vagueness, squared
standard vagueness, the angle measure for social preferences (SVO angle), as
well as their interaction on the activity choice in the treatment section of the
data. Standard vagueness as well as the squared term remain signiﬁcant, with
coeﬃcients similar to those of previous models. Social preferences alone do not
seem to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect, but the interaction with standard vagueness
is signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level. The data indicates a less negative eﬀect
of standard vagueness for participants with ’more prosocial’ preferences. This
ﬁnding is in line with the prediction of Hypothesis 4. Yet, I do not ﬁnd social
preferences to alter the degree of convexity of the response function. While the
coeﬃcient of the interaction between the social preference measure and squared
standard vagueness has the expected sign and magnitude, it is not signiﬁcant.
As I ﬁnd social preferences to aﬀect the level of the choice variable, but not
it’s shape, I cannot fully accept Hypothesis 4.
Result 4 (social value orientation): Participants whose preferences are
’more prosocial’ decrease activity levels relatively less in response to in-
creases in standard vagueness. Defensive Behavior seems somewhat miti-
gated by social preferences.
Since social preferences aﬀect activity choices, I proceed to inquire whether
stated social preference can predict the actual activity choice in the main part
of the experiment. The right panel of Figure 4.4 delivers an insight into the
predictive power. I generate predictions for the activity choice by plugging
the individual β-values into the theoretical model. The results are plotted
against the actual activity choice. Choices in which the social preference is
consistent across the two tasks are found in close proximity to the 45˝-line.
Firstly, it can be seen that the majority of predictions based on the stated so-
cial preference are too high, indicating that social preferences are inconsistent
across diﬀerent tasks. Secondly, the accuracy of predictions based on social
preferences decreases with standard vagueness. The latter ﬁnding could indi-
cate that higher standard vagueness is also perceived as a lack of behavioural
guidance by the law maker and reduces the perceived importance of fairness
and prosocial conduct of the individuals.
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Figure 4.4 Measured social value orientation and its impact on activity choice
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Result 4b (social value orientation): The accuracy of choice predictions,
based on social preferences declines as standard vagueness increases. Pre-
dictions of activity choices, based on the observed social preferences are on
average too high.
Hypothesis 5: Increasingly erratic behaviour
In Hypothesis 5, I suggest that the variability of chosen activity levels in-
creases as standard vagueness grows larger. This translates into increasingly
erratic behaviour, an infrequently discussed byproduct of vague standards. As
behaviour becomes more diﬃcult to predict, the law looses its coordination
function. In practice the legal standard serves as a measure to coordinate
precaution. It indicates to a potentially injured party whether a possible tort-
feasor will take precaution or whether it is best to purchase insurance. As
behavior becomes increasingly erratic, this function of the standard is lost.
I deﬁne the variability in terms of the standard deviation of chosen activity
levels, for each degree of standard vagueness. By means of a Jonckheere-
Terpstra test, I reject that variability is constant over changes in standard
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vagueness, against the alternative, that it increases. Aside from the cost
through overcompliance, as established in Hypothesis 3, we can therefore as-
sociate high levels of standard vagueness with a cost from the uncertainty for
potential injured parties, as these adapt their behaviour, become cautious or
invest in insurance to brace for injury without restitution.
The results listed in Table 4.5 in the Appendix conﬁrm the conjecture
drawn from the right panel of Figure 4.3 in the data description. I therefore
ﬁnd strong support for Hypothesis 5.
Result 5 (variability): As standard vagueness increases, choice behaviour
becomes increasingly erratic.
4.5 Discussion
In this chapter I investigate the eﬀect of legal standard vagueness on the in-
vestment in compliance with the standard. It therefore ﬁts into the law and
economics literature on compliance and deterrence. In the experimental litera-
ture, it complements the vast body of literature on deterrence under uncertain
or risky punishment conditions, but focuses on a scenario outside of crimi-
nal law. Here, the policy maker doesn’t want to minimize a certain type of
behaviour, but rather to induce eﬃcient behaviour.
Aside from re-testing the ﬁndings from Chapter 3, namely a U-shaped
relationship between the investment in precaution and the degree of standard
vagueness, this experiment investigates the interplay of vague standards with
social preferences where a participant’s actions impose an externality on a
second participant.
While I do ﬁnd convexity in the response function to the vague standard, I
cannot replicate the U-shaped response function, moving from overcompliance
to undercompliance, which had been reported in the previous chapter. Instead,
the activity choice decreases over the entire tested range of standard vagueness.
Still, a more detailed analysis reveals that slightly less than a third of the
participants make choices according to a U-shaped relationship.
The data also fails to present a treatment eﬀect. Even after controlling for
diﬀerent degrees of social preferences, participants make similar choices in the
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baseline and the treatment section of the experiment.
A possible explanation for the ﬂatter U-shape, the lack of a treatment
eﬀect and even the unexpected overcompliance in the treatment section might
be that the expression of social preferences generally diﬀers across situations.
A possible explanation for this can be found in theories of social psychology.
Cognitive dissonance aversion (Festinger, 1957; Aronson, 1969; Konow, 2000)
predicts that individuals prefer to reduce the "dissonance" or psychological
inconsistency of their motivations and choices by altering their behaviour.11
On the one hand, it is possible that a participant who has made one or more
overcompliant decisions will be more inclined to make similar decisions at
other vagueness levels. On the other hand, this theory might explain the
small treatment eﬀect. The participant may experience cognitive dissonance
between her self-interest for increasing her own payoﬀ and fairness towards the
aﬀected second player. To reduce this unpleasant conﬂict, without reducing
self-interested behaviour, the participant may engage in self-deception. The
participant can do so by telling herself that the moral responsibility towards
the second player is outsourced to the authority who sets and enforces the
behavioural standard.
A further potential explanation for the results may be the design of the
choice architecture, which may have induced status-quo bias. Although the
participants could freely choose the order in which they edited the scenar-
ios, with and without an aﬀected second player, most participants initially
attended to the choice scenarios which did not involve a second player. By
having already chosen an activity level for each level of standard vagueness
in the baseline section, the participants may have provided their own anchor
for the equivalent decision in the treatment section, where a second player is
involved. Experimental evidence documents the existence of anchoring in se-
quential decisions and also suggests that status-quo bias is particularly strong
for large choice sets (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), such as the one in
present experiment. A similar argument can explain the monotonic decrease
in the choice variable when vagueness increases. The gradual change of the
11 Of particular interest here is the literature on the experienced dissonance following a
decision- making process. Early experimental evidence has been provided by Brehm (1956),
who ﬁnds that individuals who were asked to reevaluate a diﬃcult decision tend to reinforce
their preference for the chosen option. The author asked individuals to rate two appliances
and then choose between them. When the individuals were asked to rate them again, the
individuals emphasised the positive attributes of their chosen option and attenuated the
negative aspects.
87
vague standard might be responsible for preventing participants from detect-
ing the level at with a change in behaviour might be beneﬁcial. A popular
metaphor for behaviour of this type is that a frog can be boiled if he is put
into a pot with cold water and the temperature is increased just slowly enough.
Yet, if the frog was placed into a pot of boiling water, he would jump right
out. As a suggestion for further research, the study might be replicated on
a between subjects basis; that is, subjects choosing activity levels at diﬀer-
ing levels of standard vagueness for either the second player scenarios or the
non-second player scenarios.
While I ﬁnd an eﬀect of social preferences on the activity choice and ﬁnd
that pro-social preferences somewhat mitigate defensive behavior, the results
from the post test only weakly predict actual activity choices. On average,
the employed data from the post test delivered predictions that were too high,
suggesting that subjects were on average more prosocial in the post test, than
in the main game. This might have to do with the relatively higher degree
of complexity in the main task of the experiment. As a consequence, partici-
pants may have been preoccupied with the assessment of their own proﬁt and
potential liability, rather than the impact on another participant. This would
also be in line with the ﬁnding that the precision of the prediction based on
social preferences decreases with increases in standard vagueness.
Alternatively, it is also possible that the law maker is perceived as the moral
authority in the experiment. As such, he assumes responsibility for the em-
ployment of fair standards and crowds out individual social preferences or fear
of social diapproval12 Moreover, increasingly vague standards can be perceived
as unfair and break down fair and pro-social conduct in the laboratory.
Finally, I conﬁrm the intuition from Chapter 3 regarding the existence of a
further hidden cost to standard vagueness. When the behaviour of one party
becomes increasingly erratic, it becomes very diﬃcult for society to anticipate.
The consequence may be an excessive investment in insurance by the potential
bearer of an externality or by a state entity.
12 This can be related to the ﬁeld study by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) who ﬁnd that the
intruction of a fee system for parents who pick their children up late from kindergarden has
adverse eﬀects. The regulation of the situation has parents crowd out their social preferences
towards the teachers.
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4.6 Conclusion
The experimental results presented in this chapter oﬀer a contrasting view to
Calfee and Craswell’s (1986) results, as well as to the experimental evidence
in Chapter 3. In fact, the results oﬀer empirical support to the argument
of traditional legal scholars, who claim that the increase of legal uncertainty
leads to the erosion of socially beneﬁcial activity levels. The data doesn’t hint
at the presence of a desirable alternative to legal certainty and provides two
arguments for the systematic reduction of legal standard vagueness: On the
one hand, ineﬃciency (in terms of overcompliance) increases with standard
vagueness, and on the other hand choice behaviour becomes more erratic and
less predictable. The latter expense is discussed less frequently, but can be very
high. Passive parties, potential bearers of the externality, who seek to shield
themselves from costly externalities are induced to invest in precaution by
purchasing insurance or opting out of socially beneﬁcial activities completely.
While we ﬁnd that pro-social preferences somewhat mitigate defensive be-
havior, it looks as if individuals do not distinguish between situations in which
they saliently harm another individual and those in which they don’t. This can
serve as an explanation for the prevalence of defensive behaviour in principal-
agent relationships in which agents forego the best action, out of fear of liability.
Instead, individual social concerns seem to lose priority when individuals are
confronted with a vague standard. This result indicates that lawmakers cannot
rely on the intrinsic motivation which generates socially desirable outcomes in
a variety of other scenarios. Whether this is due to dealing with increasingly
complex situations or to an adverse signalling eﬀect is unclear. Despite the di-
vergence from previous results, this study further highlights the sensitivity to
legal standard vagueness and should raise awareness amongst law- and policy
makers. It should also provide the motivation to investigate the perception of,
and the reaction to standard vagueness in the ﬁeld and in more clearly deﬁned
legal situations, such as medical malpractice or tax compliance. This might
oﬀer further insight into the reaction to vague standards in diﬀerent contexts
of social proximity and might have the potential to reduce society’s cost of
defensive behaviour.
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4.7 Appendix
Figure 4.5 Over- and undercompliance including Rawlsian Preferences
xs
= 500
Activity level, x
Degree of standard vagueness, σRawlsian Preferences
(α = 0, β = 1)
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Figure 4.6 Sample Screen of the Decision Screen in the Experiment
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Table 4.3: Results from the questionnaire
Self-reported math level 1 2 3 4 5
"What level of math basic basic percent & percent & optimization
do you still feel arithmetic arithmetic fractions fractions problems
comfortable with?" (written) mental) (written) (mental) (written)
6.6% 14.5% 32.9% 23.7% 22.4%
Understanding 1 2 3 4 5
"Do you feel that you "I am not sure "I did not "Only "Yes, but "Yes, it
understood the task I understood understand partially." it wasn’t was easy."
in the main game?" the task the task de- easy."
correctly." scription."
1.3% 0.0% 2.6% 35.5% 60.5%
Table 4.4: Eﬀect of standard vagueness and squared standard vagueness on
the activity choice in the treatment data
Activity choice Activity choice
Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (OLS)
SD ´0.622*** ´0.4131***
(0.0827) (0.1192)
SD2 0.0008*** 0.0005**
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Risk Preferences ´4.189*
(1.7312)
(Intercept) 500 500
(set within the model) (set within the model)
*: p ă 0.10; **:p ă 0.05; ***:p ă 0.01
Table 4.5: Jonckheere-Terpstra test on changes in variablity
Subset Alternative Hypothesis Test statistic P-value
(JT )
Overall Increasing 59 0.001
Baseline Increasing 15 0.003
Treatment Increasing 15 0.003
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Figure 4.7 Individual choices in the baseline condition
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Figure 4.8 Individual choices in the baseline condition, classiﬁed by their
coeﬃcients
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2010: Lisette Nigot Memorial Prize in French
Computer skills
Basic: Maple, MATLAB
Intermediate: LATEX, OpenOﬃce, R, Stata
Advanced: Microsoft Oﬃce, Ztree
Conferences & workshop presentations
2015: 11th Annual Conference of the Italian Association of Law and Economics, Naples
2015: 32nd Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics, Vienna
2015: LAMB International Research Network Conference: Junior Scholars in Behavioural and
Experimental Law and Economics, Dublin
2015: PhD Conference in Behavioural Science, Stirling
2014: International Congress of Applied Psychology, Paris
2014: 7th IMPRS Uncertainty Thesis Workshop, Castle Oppurg
2013: 6th IMPRS Uncertainty Thesis Workshop, Castle Ringberg
Languages
German: Mothertongue
English: Fluent
French: Intermediate Coversationally ﬂuent, DALF certiﬁed
Swedish & Dutch: Basic A2 certiﬁed
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